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ARE STATUTES REALLY "LEGISLATIVE
BARGAINS"? THE FAILURE OF THE
CONTRACT ANALOGY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
MARK L. MOVSESIAN*
Recent scholarship draws an analogy between contract and
statutory interpretation. In this Article, Professor Movsesian
explores and rejects that analogy. There are key differences
between contracts and statutes, he argues; the intentionalism of
contemporary contract law is inappropriate in the context of
statutory interpretation. After critically examining the literature
on the topic and demonstrating the operative distinctions between
contracts and statutes, Professor Movsesian provides a useful
illustration in the form of the famous case of Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States. Professor Movsesian shows how a
comparison of contract and statutory interpretation sheds light on
a number of interesting questions, including the character of third-
party beneficiary contracts, the nature of political representation,
the role of bicameralism and presentment in the legislative
process, and the ongoing debate about the use of legislative history
in determining the meaning of statutory language.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary legislation scholarship finds inspiration in a
variety of sources. Nothing is too remote or esoteric: statutory
interpretation today draws on everything from literary criticism to
microeconomics. 1 In part, this eclecticism reflects a wider movement
toward interdisciplinary analysis in American law.2 In part, it reflects
an assumption that one can usefully compare the interpretation of
statutes and the interpretation of other texts: "chain novels,"3 for
1. On the relationship between statutory interpretation and literary criticism, see,
for example, GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 149-50, 156-57, 159,
163-64, 166 (1995), Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory:
Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979), James
Boyd White, Law As Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV.
415,415 (1982), and R. Shep Melnick, Statutory Reconstruction: The Politics of Eskridge's
Interpretation, 84 GEO. L.J. 91, 93 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)). For an application of microeconomics
in statutory interpretation, see, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 15-16
(1984), and William N. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975). Contemporary legislation
scholarship draws from other disciplines as well. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 609 (1990) (continental
philosophy); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) (positive political theory); Symposium, What Is
Meaning in a Legal Text?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1995) (linguistics). The extent to which
the new eclecticism has influenced courts is doubtful. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. Cr. REv. 231,
231 ("The Justices have not been reading their Derrida."); see also David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 921-22 (1992)
("While academics vigorously debate the merits and applicability of deconstructionism,
public choice theory, purposive analysis, and various theories of 'dynamic' statutory
interpretation, justices of the Supreme Court are attempting with missionary zeal to
narrow the focus of consideration to the statutory text and its 'plain meaning.'" (footnote
omitted)).
2. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 1921 (1993); Symposium, Writing Across the Margins, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
941 (1996).
3. See RONALD DwORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32, 313 (1986). A "chain novel"-
an "artificial genre of literature" that Dworkin derives in part from English parlor
games-is one written by several authors seriatim. "[E]ach novelist in the chain
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example, or personal correspondence.4
Until recently, relatively little scholarship has attempted to draw
comparisons between the interpretation of statutes and the
interpretation of other legal texts.5 In the last few years, however, a
number of articles have suggested an analogy between statutes and
contracts.6 Unlike the earlier law-and-economics literature, which
contended that statutes should be understood as bargains between
interprets the chapters he has been given in order to write a new chapter, which is then
added to what the next novelist receives, and so on." Id. at 229. The analogy relates
primarily to Dworkin's description of the common-law method, see id. at 238, but he
makes clear that it applies in the context of statutory interpretation as well, see id. at 313.
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch Some Soupmeat," 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209
(1995) (discussing illustration devised by nineteenth-century legal scholar Francis Lieber).
5. See Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REV.
667, 667 (1991). Farber believes that scholarly specialization accounts for this fact, at
least in part. "Few ... legislation scholars teach courses like property or contracts," he
points out, and "of those few, most probably regard these courses as pedagogical chores
rather than potential sources of inspiration." Id. at 668.
6. Three of the more thorough discussions are Farber, supra note 5, McNollgast,
supra note 1, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a 'They,' Not an It': Legislative Intent
As Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). For other suggestions of analogies
between contract and statutory interpretation, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 122-23,
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 93-94 (1991),
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 150 (1990), Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 60
(1988), Carlos E. Gonzdlez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REv. 585,
597 (1996), McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 9-10, 19-20,
Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court and
Legislative Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 134 & n.70 (1995), W. David Slawson,
Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law,
44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 416, 419-20 (1992), George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75
B.U. L. REv. 321, 346 n.112 (1995), George H. Taylor, Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 259, 319 n.250 (1995) [hereinafter Taylor, Textualism at Work], Jason Scott
Johnston, Not So Cold an Eye: Richard Posner's Pragmatism, 44 VAND. L. REV. 741,750-
51 & n.59 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990)), and Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529,
555-57 (1997) (reviewing A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]). Cf. Saul
Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 618-22 (1996) (discussing
agreements among legislators to vote in blocs). For earlier attempts, see Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419-20 (1899), and
Charles B. Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REv. 509, 516-
17,520 (1940).
Some recent judicial opinions also draw analogies between contract and statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 595 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. National Steel Corp., 75 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Posner, J.); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575-76, 577
(7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.); Terra Int'l Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334,
1373 n.25 (N.D. Iowa 1996). But cf. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. DeLaGarza, 444 N.W.2d 803,
807 (Mich. 1989) (distinguishing between contract and statutory interpretation).
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legislatures and private interest groups,7 these more recent articles
envision statutes as bargains among the legislators themselves. For
purposes of interpretation, they argue, courts should treat statutes
like contracts: in determining the meaning of statutory language,
courts should employ the interpretive method of contract law.
This Article explores, and rejects, the contract analogy. It
focuses on a problem familiar to contract and legislation scholars
alike. Suppose that the words of a text bear an objective meaning.
Suppose, that is, that a reasonable person, with an appropriate
understanding of linguistic conventions, would understand the words
in a certain way. Suppose further that the history of the text's
drafting demonstrates that the drafters understood the words in a
way that differs from the objective meaning. Suppose, finally, that a
court is called upon to interpret the text. Which should prevail, the
objective meaning of the words or the drafters' subjective intent?
The answer, as this Article demonstrates, depends on whether
7. Landes and Posner offer a classic description of this view of legislation:
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government,
legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of
favorable legislation.... Payment takes the form of campaign contributions,
votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In
short, legislation is "sold" by the legislature and "bought" by the beneficiaries of
the legislation.
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 877 (footnote omitted). Some versions of interest-
group theory, strongly influenced by pluralism, treat legislators "more like notary publics
... who merely record the deal struck" by private interest groups. Marci A. Hamilton,
Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an
Attomeyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 498 (1994); cf.
Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 18 ("If statutes are bargains among special interests, they
should be enforced like contracts."). Interest-group theories of legislation have been the
subject of extensive commentary, see, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 12-37;
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.L 31 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226,
233-40 (1986); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 562-65, 568-71 (1988); cf Levmore, supra note 6 (exploring various
"contractual commitments" legislators might make to constituents with regard to
legislators' voting), but they are not the focus of this Article.
Eskridge has suggested yet another contract analogy, contending that one might view
legislation as a contract between the legislature and the judge who implements the
statute. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Cycling Legislative Intent, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 260,262 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 319, 321, 326 (1989); cf. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History,
66 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 321, 347-48 (1990) (viewing legislation as a relational contract
between the legislature and administrative agency). The assertion that courts are agents
of the legislature is, of course, controversial, see Macey, supra, at 236 n.56, and a matter
beyond the scope of this Article.
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the text is a contract or a statute. Contract interpretation is properly
intentionalist: in interpreting a contract, a court properly looks to the
shared intent of the parties rather than the objective meaning of the
written agreement. A contract, after all, is a private agreement that
binds only the parties who make it.8 It exists independently of any
writing the parties have adopted to memorialize it: the writing is not
the contract, but merely evidence of the contract.9 In traditional
form, moreover, a contract comprises just two parties and a limited
subject matter."0  Given all this, intentionalism is a sensible
interpretive strategy. Concerns about notice to third persons do not
exist; the writing bears little formal significance; and there is small
chance that examining a contract's negotiating history will present
great practical burdens.
But a statute differs from a contract in fundamental ways. A
statute is not a private agreement that binds only the legislators who
enact it, but a public document that establishes rules of conduct for
people outside the legislature-rules those people must follow, in
many instances, on pain of fine or imprisonment." A statute does
not exist apart from its written text; as a constitutional matter, a
statute is its written text.'2 Unlike a contract, moreover, a statute
typically addresses numerous subjects and involves hundreds of
"parties," most of whom vote without ever explaining their
understanding of the legislation. 3 In this context, the intentionalism
of contract law is incongruous. Given the concern with notice to
thirdpersons, the formal significance of the statutory text, and the
practical difficulty of discovering the collective intent of hundreds of
legislators, there is little reason to allow legislative intent to prevail
over the objective meaning of a statutory text.
The failure of the contract analogy reveals much about the
essential, and essentially different, qualities of contracts and statutes.
In addition, as we shall see, a comparison of contract and statutory
interpretation yields insights on a number of difficult and timely
issues, including the character of third-party beneficiary contracts, 4
the nature of political representation (in particular, the question
8. See infra text accompanying notes 127-30.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
10. See infra text accompanying note 123.
11. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 214-21.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 234-37.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 174-83.
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whether legislators serve as their constituents' "agents"), 15 and the
role of bicameralism and presentment in our constitutional system.16
Finally, a comparative study of contract and statutory interpretation
supplies a useful context for evaluating the ongoing debate about the
appropriate use of legislative history in determining the meaning of
statutory language. 7
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers two of the
more thorough expositions of the contract analogy, McNollgast's
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation,8 and Daniel Farber's Legislative Deals and Statutory
Bequests. 9 Part II describes the objectivism of classical contract
interpretation and demonstrates why contract law has largely
rejected that approach in favor of its present intentionalism.2' Part
III examines the failure of the contract analogy in statutory
interpretation. After providing a famous illustration,' it explores the
reasons for the analogy's failure, focusing particularly on the problem
of third-party effects?3 and the troublesome concept of legislative
intent.2 4 Part III closes with some further words on the illustration
with which it began.25 Finally, the Article concludes with some more
general observations about legal interpretation.26
I. THE CONTRACr ANALOGY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. The Contract Analogy According to McNollgast
A good place to begin exploring the contract analogy is
McNollgast's 1992 article, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation.' In McNollgast's view, a statute
is essentially a contract about public policy; its parties, the "members
15. See infra text accompanying notes 184-209.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 224-30.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 233-52.
18. McNollgast, supra note 1; see infra Part I.A. For the uninitiate, "McNollgast"
refers to Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast.
19. Farber, supra note 5; see infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part III.A (discussing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892)).
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part III.D.
26. See infra text following note 264.
27. McNollgast, supra note 1. McNollgast develops some of these themes further in
McNollgast, supra note 6.
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of the legislative coalition that enact[s]" it.' Like contract
interpretation, therefore, statutory interpretation should be
intentionalist: a court should attempt to discover and give effect to
the parties' actual agreement.29 The statutory text will provide some
evidence. If the text failed to render at least a reasonably reliable
sense of the legislative bargain, McNollgast explains, the legislators
would not have voted for it.30 But statutory language is likely to be
imprecise. Rational legislators, with many other responsibilities, will
not spend the time necessary to state a bargain with perfect clarity or
to provide for every eventuality.31  To capture the complete
agreement, therefore, a court must search the statute's legislative
history for "implicit bargains," relating to interpretation and other
matters, that do not appear in the statutory text.32
But how, precisely, to discover those implicit bargains?
McNolgast concedes that "the interpretive problem is much more
difficult for legislation than for contracts," both because of the larger
number of parties involved and because courts have not developed a
coherent understanding of the legislative process. 33 But, McNollgast
argues, positive political theory can "make a significant contribution
to overcoming" these "difficulties." '  Positive political theory views
28. McNollgast, supra note 1, at 705.
29. See id. at 705 n.3, 709-10; McNollgast, supra note 6, at 5, 7, 8. In describing this
interpretive strategy, McNollgast occasionally employs the term "statutory intent."
McNollgast, supra note 1, at 706. According to McNollgast, "the intent of a statute is to
codify the agreement of the enacting coalition with respect to the policy adopted, in part
so that members of the enacting coalition can know more precisely the nature of their
agreement and in part to convey instructions to agencies and courts." Id. at 706-07.
30. See McNollgast, supra note 1, at 714; see also McNollgast, supra note 6, at 12
("[L]egislation must be regarded by relevant political actors as a reasonably reliable
determinant of policy outcomes.").
31. See McNollgast, supra note 1, at 714-15.
32. See id. at 718 (arguing that the "policy bargain" comprises statutory text and
"implicit agreements over ambiguous provisions and how the explicit bargain will be
applied to unforeseen circumstances"); id. at 738.
33. Id. at 710. "[W]hile contracts typically reflect a bargain between two parties
having conflicting interests," McNollgast writes, "legislation usually results from
bargaining among numerous parties having a wider diversity of purposes." Id. at 710-11.
34. Id. at 706. The "core general presumption" of positive political theory, Mashaw
observes, is that one can explain "political behavior ... as the outcome of rational (and
often strategic) action by relevantly situated individuals within some set of defined
institutionalized boundaries." Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process:
Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development, J.L. EcoN. & ORG.,
Special Issue 1990, at 267, 280; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:
Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.. 457, 462 (1992) (defining positive
political theory as a set of "non-normative, rational-choice theories of political
institutions" (emphasis omitted)). See generally Symposium, Positive Political Theory and
Law (pts. 1 & 2), 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995), 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996)
1998] 1 51
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the legislative process as a series of "veto gates" through which a
statute must pass in order to become law:35  subcommittee,
committee, conference committee, and, in the usual course, the
President. 6 In the enactment of any statute, the crucial actors are the
ones who "approve[] the legislation at each of the veto points. '37
Positive political theory suggests, therefore, that the proper goal of
statutory interpretation is to determine the intentions of the "veto
players":3 1 to uncover the implicit agreements, reached among veto
players, that underlie the explicit language of the statute. 9
McNollgast proposes four canons to assist a court in this
endeavor." Two, in particular, are important for our purposes.41 The
first, "consequential statements and actions have priority over
inconsequential ones,"'4 follows from what we have already
discussed: the preferences of veto players take priority over the
preferences of other legislators.43 The second canon attempts to
assist a court in identifying who the veto players were. "[T]he totality
of the legislative history," it teaches, "conveys important information
about whose preferences were most consequential in shaping the
(discussing various implications of positive political theory). McNollgast likens the role of
positive political theory in statutory interpretation to "the basic principles of economics
that underlie contract law." McNollgast, supra note 1, at 738.
35. See McNollgast, supra note 1, at 720.
36. See id. at 721,724-25.
37. Id. at 721.
38. See id. at 707, 725.
39. See id. at 707.
40. See id. at 73 6-37, 707-08.
41. McNollgast summarizes the total set of canons as follows:
The first canon of evaluating legislative history should be that consequential
actions have priority over inconsequential ones. The second canon, following
from the first, is that decisions by legislators to reject language provide useful
negative inferences about statutes. The third canon is that the totality of
legislative history conveys important information about whose preferences were
most consequential in shaping the coalitional agreement. That is, in the
sequence of veto points through which a statute must pass, some are likely to be
much closer calls than others, and it is at these stages where the details of the
coalitional agreement are most profoundly shaped. The fourth canon is that,
because both statutes and the Constitution give a role to the President in the
legislative process, statutory interpretation must take the President's
preferences into account and must accord them considerable weight if the
President possessed a credible veto threat over the statute in question.
Id. at 736-37. One can see that the second and fourth canons are really only corollaries to
the first and third.
42. Id at707,736.
43. McNollgast cautions that a court should discount merely "strategic" actions, like
presidential signing statements, for which the veto players cannot be held accountable by
other participants in the process. See id. at 725-27. For more on presidential signing
statements, see ABNER J. MIKvA & ERic LANE, LEGISLATIVE PRocEss 784-85 (1995).
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coalitional agreement."'  The relative importance of veto points,
after all, differs for every statute. For one, the objections of a
committee chair may pose the greatest obstacle to enactment; for
another, the threat of presidential veto.45 According to McNollgast, a
careful examination of legislative history can help identify which
players most profoundly influenced a statute's passage, and,
consequently, whose intentions carry the most weight.46
Thus the contract analogy according to McNollgast: armed with
the insights of positive political theory, a court should attempt to
discover and enforce the actual legislative bargain-the agreement
the relevant legislators "thought they were making."'47 McNollgast
anticipates that textualists might find the contract analogy
"inappropriate," but ultimately dismisses their concerns.' In the
end, McNollgast writes, "textualism's prohibition on the use of
legislative history makes it less likely that the court[] will choose the
interpretation that would have been chosen by the act's enacting
coalition."4 9 But why should a court give effect to a "bargain" that
fails to appear in the statutory text? With regard to a contract, we
shall see, there are good reasons to give effect to the shared intent of
the parties, whatever the language of the written memorial of their
agreement.5 0 Do those reasons apply with regard to a statute?
B. The Contract Analogy According to Farber
Before turning to that question, though, consider another
thoughtful exposition of the contract analogy, Daniel Farber's
Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests.51 Like McNollgast, Farber
44. McNollgast, supra note 1, at 736.
45. See id. at 724-25,736.
46. See id. at 737. In a later article, McNollgast relies on the principles of "signaling
behavior" to help in "identifying the pivotal political actors who formed a majority
coalition in enacting a bill, and ... detecting the actions that reveal their policy
preferences." McNollgast, supra note 6, at 7.
47. See McNollgast, supra note 6, at 7.
48. One reason why "legal scholars and judges" reject the contract analogy,
McNollgast writes, is that they simply fail to understand positive political theory as well as
they do the "basic principles of economics that underlie contract law." McNollgast, supra
note 1, at 738.
49. Id. (emphasis omitted).
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. Farber, supra note 5. Farber modestly describes this piece, which also addresses
analogies between wills and statutes, see id. at 671-78, as merely a "tentative effort." Id.
at 668. In fact, it constitutes the first really systematic exploration of the connections
between private- and public-law interpretation. Cf Johnston, supra note 6, at 751 n.59
(describing Farber's article as an "important initial stab at developing the contract
analogy").
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believes that "contract models capture an important aspect of
statutory interpretation."52 Like contracts, statutes are drafted by
people whose preferences differ and whose interests conflict, at least
in part. 3 As a result, Farber contends, contract law can illuminate
questions of statutory interpretation.-' Specifically, contract law can
offer guidance on the question whether, in interpreting the language
of a statute, a court should consider extrinsic evidence of the
legislators' intent.55
Whether a court should look to extrinsic evidence, Farber
argues, depends on the "parties' "sensitivity to risk. To illustrate, he
poses two hypothetical cases. The first involves a contract between
two publicly held corporations, the terms of which provide that one
shall have a fifty-percent share of the other's "profits."56 The parties
to this contract, Farber explains, will be "fairly indifferent" to the risk
that a court will misinterpret the term "profits" in the context of a
lawsuit between them: their shareholders will have protected
themselves against such risk by holding diversified equity portfolios.5 7
As a result, Farber contends, the parties will prefer to leave the term
vague and avoid the transaction costs they would incur in negotiating
more specific contractual language. For the same reason, he
suggests, they would disfavor the use of extrinsic evidence-the
agreement's negotiating history-in the contract's interpretation.
Creating such evidence raises transaction costs at the time the parties
draft the contract and litigation costs later. 9
52. Farber, supra note 5, at 678. To be fair, Farber concedes at the outset that the
contract analogy is not exact. Unlike the parties to a contract, for example, legislators
cannot "breach" a statute, and pay damages to other legislators, if they decide they do not
approve the way a statute is being administered. See id.; cf Levmore, supra note 6, at
621-22 (conjecturing that courts would not "enforce an agreement among ... legislators
to vote up or down when deciding on some future program").
53. See Farber, supra note 5, at 679.
54. See id. Farber limits his attention to the "simplest kind of interpretation problem:
that in which the drafters had a particular situation in mind and adopted language
addressing it, so that the interpretation problem is caused only by an ambiguous or vague
text." Id. at 668-69.
55. See id. at 670. Farber also discusses the implications of the contract analogy on
the question of stare decisis in statutory cases, see id. at 682-83, 686-87, a matter that this
Article does not address.
56. See id- at 679.
57. See id. at 680-81; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 153-56 (5th ed. 1996) (describing how portfolio
diversification reduces risk). Farber assumes that the parties "are sophisticated and fully
informed about possible biases" on the part of the court. Farber, supra note 5, at 680.
58. See Farber, supra note 5, at 681.
59. See id. at 683.
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Farber likens this hypothetical contract to a "classic regulatory
statute[]," the Natural Gas Act, which provides that pipeline
companies may exact only "reasonable" charges for the
transportation of natural gas." Farber suggests that one can
understand this statute as a bargain between legislators who
supported the interests of pipeline companies and legislators who
supported the interests of petroleum producers. 61 Rather than spend
the time necessary to hammer out a detailed compromise on
transportation charges, the legislators agreed to a vague term-
"reasonable"-to which agencies (and courts, presumably) could give
specific content. Farber concludes that the legislators would "have
little reason to favor the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret their
bargain."'62 Creating and employing legislative history is expensive,
after all, and it simply would not be "worthwhile to incur ...
transaction costs in the hope of a more accurate interpretation of the
statute. ' 63 Shareholders of both pipeline and petroleum companies
would have neutralized the risk of misinterpretation by holding
diversified stock portfolios.'
Farber's second illustration involves a contract between parties
that are averse to risk. Farber poses a hypothetical divorce
settlement in which the husband agrees to give the wife half the
"profits" from a small business he runs.65 Just as in the first
hypothetical, there is a risk that a court will ultimately misinterpret
the vague term "profits." But while publicly held corporations will
be neutral with regard to such a risk, individuals will not be
indifferent. Unlike the corporations' shareholders, neither husband
nor wife can easily minimize the consequences of misinterpretation
by diversifying their equity holdings. As a result, Farber explains, the
parties to this contract "have a strong incentive to ... sharpen[] the
definition of profits."66 In addition, despite transaction costs, they
have an interest in maintaining a record of the contract's negotiation
for use in its eventual interpretation.
The statutory analogue to this model, Farber contends, is
legislation that "resolve[s] important conflicting interests between
60. See id. at 682; 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1994).
61. See Farber, supra note 5, at 682.
62. Id. at 683.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 682.
65. See id. at 684.
66. Id.
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groups of individuals."'67 As an example, Farber gives Title VII, the
federal statute that prohibits discrimination in employment. Farber
paints Title VII as a deal between those legislators who supported
anti-discrimination legislation and those who wished to protect the
seniority of unionized workers.6 9 Neither minorities nor unionized
workers felt indifferent to the risk of losing employment, and so the
legislators could not settle for a vague term that courts might
misinterpret.70 Instead, they worked out a detailed compromise on
seniority rights that courts largely have enforced, Farber writes,
"even at the expense" of Title VII's "overall purpose. '71 Farber
contends that the concern about misinterpretation should cause
parties to a legislative compromise like Title VII to favor a court's
use of legislative history, "despite some higher transaction costs. 72
Farber's analysis is insightful and, in some respects, persuasive.
He demonstrates quite effectively that differently situated "parties"
have different incentives regarding the use of negotiating history in
the interpretation of a text. But this returns us to the question we
asked with regard to McNollgast 73-a question that Farber, too,
anticipates.74 Does it make sense, whatever the "parties' "incentives,
to equate the role of intent in contract and statutory interpretation?
Do the justifications for intentionalism in contract law make sense
when it comes to a statute?75
67. Id.
68. See id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1994).
69. See Farber, supra note 5, at 684.
70. See id. ("Because of the central economic importance of employment for most
people, employment-related risks are often large and not easily diversifiable.").
71. ld.
72. Id. at 686.
73. See supra text following note 49.
74. Farber concedes that his analysis "glide[s] past an important normative question."
Farber, supra note 5, at 669. Contract law, he writes, "is largely dedicated to facilitating
private ordering, so that people can enter into beneficial transactions." Id. "Depending
on what we think of legislators," he observes, "we might or might not want to design
interpretive rules that will further their purposes." Id.; see also id. at 688 (noting that his
contract models "assume, rather naively, that the normative goal is to implement the
desires of the enacting legislature").
75. This is a good place to note a third interesting version of the contract analogy,
Slawson's Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the
Rule of Law. Slawson, supra note 6. Like McNollgast and Farber, Slawson believes that
one can draw useful comparisons between contract and statutory interpretation. See id. at
416, 419-20, 421. Unlike them, though, Slawson proceeds on the assumption that contract
interpretation is itself non-intentionalist. See id. at 421. Slawson finds, in the objective
theory of contracts, support for a textualist approach to statutory interpretation. See id.;
see also Holmes, supra note 6, at 419-20 (arguing that contracts and statutes should both
receive an objective interpretation). The problem, though, is that contemporary contract
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II. THE ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
To see why contract analogies of the sort proposed by
McNollgast and Farber fail, one must appreciate some fundamental
principles of contract interpretation. There are basically two
approaches to interpretation in American contract law: a "classical"
approach, which holds that interpretation is essentially a matter of
determining the objective meaning of the words the parties have
used, and an intentionalist approach, which holds that interpretation
is essentially a matter of discovering the shared intent of the parties.76
These two approaches have more or less coexisted since at least the
turn of the century, with one or the other gaining a temporary
advantage among judges and scholars." Nonetheless, one can
understand the history of twentieth-century contract interpretation
largely as a shift from classicism to intentionalism.7s To understand
contract interpretation, then, one must appreciate why contract law
has come to reject the classical model in favor of its present
intentionalist approach.
A. Classical Contract Interpretation
The classical approach, whose advocates included Samuel
Williston, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Learned Hand, dominated
American contract law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.79  Classicism stressed the need for objectivity in the
interpretation has largely abandoned the objective approach-something Slawson himself
acknowledges. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 421 n.172; see also infra Part 11.B (discussing
contemporary contract interpretation). Thus, while I support Slawson's approach to
statutes, see infra Parts Ill.B-C, I do not believe it can be based on an analogy to contract
law.
76. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of
Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1127, 1130-35 (1994) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Expression Rules] (contrasting "classical" and "modem" contract interpretation); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1107, 1108
(1984) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Responsive Model] (contrasting subjective "will" model
and objective "classical" model); cf David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1826-27 (1991)
(contrasting "formalist" and "contextualist" modes of contract interpretation).
77. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 261, 306-07 (1985); cf. Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (1995) (arguing that contemporary courts are rejecting
intentionalism and returning to the earlier classical contract model).
78. See infra Part ll.B.
79. See Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra note 76, at 1130. Classicism itself
supplanted an earlier approach, reflected in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cases,
that was more intentionalist in nature. See Eisenberg, Responsive Model, supra note 76,
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interpretation of a written contract.80 Where the parties had adopted
a writing to reflect their agreement, it held, their subjective intentions
were essentially irrelevant. The only thing that mattered, at least in
the absence of some ambiguity, was the meaning that a reasonable
observer, familiar with trade usage and surrounding circumstances,
would give the parties' language.81 That meaning prevailed even
where one could demonstrate that the parties had shared a contrary
intent.82 As Williston explained,
at 1108 & n.1; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 77, at 306 n.118 (discussing nineteenth-
century "will" theory); Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14
ILL. L. REv. 85,85 (1919) ("[N]ear the end of the eighteenth century, and for the ensuing
half-century, the prevalent theory of contract evidently involved as a necessary element
actual mental assent."). For a good introduction to classicism in American law generally,
see Thomas C. Grey, Modem American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 495-97 (1996)
(book review).
80. See Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra note 76, at 1131 ("Classical contract law
adopted a theory of interpretation that was purely, or almost purely, objective."). The
classical model treated oral contracts differently. See infra note 94 and text
accompanying notes 89-90.
81. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 230 & cmt. a (1932); 2 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs § 607 (1920); Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra
note 76, at 1133; see also Moore v. Stevens Coal Co., 173 A. 661, 662 (Pa. 1934) (" '[T]he
terms of the contract, where unambiguous, are conclusive.., the question being, not what
intention existed in the minds of the parties, but what intention is expressed by the
language used.'" (quoting 13 C.J. Contracts § 485, at 524-25 (1917))). When the words of
the writing were ambiguous, a court could examine the parties' subjective understanding
to determine whether they "attached one appropriate meaning to their words, rather than
another equally appropriate meaning." 2 WILLISTON, supra, § 630, at 1218. Even then,
Williston cautioned,
it should be observed that it is not primarily the intention of the parties which
the court is seeking .... The fact that the parties intended their words to bear a
certain meaning, would be immaterial were it not for the fact that the words
either normally or locally might bear such meaning.
2 id. § 613, at 1186.
82 See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 81, §§ 607, 611; Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra
note 76, at 1133.
Again, it is worth noting that the triumph of objectivism was never quite complete,
even during the classical period. A good example is a standard first-year contracts case,
Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907),
decided around the turn of the century. In that case, Embry told McKittrick, his
employer, that he would quit unless McKittrick agreed to retain him for another year.
McKittrick responded by saying, "'Go ahead, you're all right.... [D]on't let that worry
you.'" Id, at 777. McKittrick subsequently discharged Embry, and Embry sued for
breach. The trial court instructed the jury that a contract for reemployment would exist if
the jury found that both Embry and McKittrick had intended to make such a contract.
See id. at 778. The appeals court reversed: what mattered was not what McKittrick
intended, but what a reasonable person in Embry's position would have understood. See
id. at 779. The appeals court took pains to note, though, that Embry's subjective
understanding was also relevant. There would be a contract, the court held, only "if what
McKittrick said would have been taken by a reasonable man to be an employment, and
Embry so understood it." Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 780 (noting that there
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[i]f a written contract is entered into, the meaning and effect
of the contract depends on the construction given the
written language by the court, and the court will give that
language its natural and appropriate meaning; and, if it is
unambiguous, will not even admit evidence of what the
parties may have thought the meaning to be.83
An illustration may be helpful. Consider the following
hypothetical case, taken from the commentary to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.' Seller and Buyer enter into a written
contract that provides that Seller will sell goods to Buyer "F.O.B. the
place of destination." Under common commercial understanding,
the term "F.O.B. the place of destination" signifies that the seller
bears the risk of damage to the goods up to that point." Nonetheless,
the parties' correspondence shows that, during negotiations, Seller
lowered the price in exchange for Buyer's agreement to bear the risk
of damage to the goods during transit. The goods sustain damage
during transit and Buyer argues that the contract requires that Seller
pay for the loss. What result?
Under the classical approach, Buyer would prevail.86  A
reasonable person, familiar with trade usage, would read the written
contract as requiring that Seller bear the risk of damage to the goods
during transit. That is the meaning the term "F.O.B. the place of
destination" would have to such a person; there is no ambiguity
whatever. To be sure, the negotiating history demonstrates that the
parties shared an understanding at odds with the language of the
written agreement. But that, under the classical approach, would be
irrelevant. The language of the writing, not the shared intention of
would be a contract if Embry understood that he was employed). For more on the
subjective elements of Embry, see Eisenberg, Responsive Model, supra note 76, at 1125-
26.
83. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 81, § 95, at 181-82; see also 2 id. § 611, at 1178
(observing that few cases allow meaning to depend on understandings attached to the
contract by the parties themselves). Holmes, as usual, put it aphoristically. "I do not
suppose that you could prove," he wrote, "that the parties to a contract orally agreed that
when they wrote five hundred feet it should mean one hundred inches, or that Bunker
Hill Monument should signify Old South Church." Holmes, supra note 6, at 420.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1981).
85. The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means 'free on board') at a
named place ... is a delivery term under which ... when the term is F.O.B. the
place of destination, the seller must at his own expense and risk transport the
goods to that place and there tender delivery of them ....
U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(b) (1992); see 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 252-53 (4th ed. 1995).
86. See Eisenberg, Responsive Model, supra note 76, at 1124.
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the parties, would prevail. 87
What arguments could justify holding parties to the language of
a written "agreement" that contradicted their shared understanding?
Supporters of the classical approach emphasized formal distinctions
and extolled the values of certainty and predictability.8 Williston, for
example, pointed to a conceptual difference between oral and written
contracts. In the typical oral contract, he argued, the parties do not
pay great attention to the words they use; the words are only
convenient "symbols" the parties employ to reflect their interior
mental states.8 9  For that reason, Williston argued, a court
interpreting an oral contract should look beyond the symbols to the
realities they represent. A court, that is, should attempt to determine
what the parties had actually intended in making the agreement. 0
A written contract, by contrast, posed an entirely different case.
Where parties take the trouble to "incorporate their agreement into a
writing," Williston argued, they do not simply "assent by means of
symbols to certain things." 91 Rather, they "assent[] to the writing as
the adequate expression of the things to which they agree." g  For
Williston, the parties' act of approving a writing superseded whatever
their intent may have been in making the agreement; the writing was
important, not simply as a reflection of underlying intent, but in
itself.93  The proper standard of interpretation was therefore
objective. In interpreting a written contract, a court should attempt
to determine only what the words of the writing would mean to a
reasonable observer, without considering the parties' actual intentY4
87. See id.
88. See Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 91
(1995); Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents,
59 Nw. U. L. REv. 751, 776-77 (1965); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 32 (1983); Grey, supra note 79, at 495-96.
89. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 81, § 606, at 1165 ("In an ordinary oral contract ...
the minds of the parties are not primarily addressed to the symbols which they are using;
they are considering the things for which the symbols stand.").
90. See 2 id. § 605.
91. 2 id. § 606, at 1165.
92. 2id.
93. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS § 3-
11, at 170 (3d ed. 1987) (explaining that, under Williston's theory, a written contract
"acquires a life and meaning of its own"); see also Friedman, supra note 88, at 775-76
(discussing the "goal of documentary autonomy" in classical contract law).
94. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 81, § 610, at 1177. Williston suggested that an
objective standard might also be appropriate in the "very unusual" case "where the
parties to the oral agreement assent to a particular form of words as the definite and
conclusive statement of their agreement." Id. § 604, at 1162-63; see also id. § 606, at 1165
n.12 (noting "[t]he theoretically possible case of an oral promise where it is agreed that
1160 [Vol. 76
STA TUTORYINTERPRETATION
But classicism rested on more than just this conceptual
distinction. Its advocates believed that classicism's certainty and
predictability promoted the security of transactions." Some
emphasized evidentiary concerns.96 An objective approach to
interpretation, they argued, reduced litigation costs and minimized
the opportunities for perjury and fraudf7 Under the classical model,
after all, a party who had signed an unambiguous writing need not
spend resources litigating a claim that the parties had, in fact, meant
something different. Courts, moreover, need not struggle to
"divine[]" the parties' intent "from self-serving testimony offered by
partisan witnesses" with "hazy" memories and "conflicting
interests."9
In addition, by discouraging inconsiderate action, the classical
model performed what Lon Fuller referred to as a "cautionary"
function.99 It was all a matter of incentives. Parties who knew that a
resort to extrinsic evidence would be impossible would deliberate
thoroughly before signing any document and make sure that the
words they chose accurately reflected their agreement. As a
consequence, its advocates believed, the classical approach fostered
business planning and prevented many disputes from arising. °0 If
parties did neglect to pay close attention to the writing they
approved, moreover, they had only themselves to blame. "[I]n
commercial transactions," Learned Hand chided, "it does not in the
end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those
who do not protect themselves."''
the particular spoken words, whatever their legal meaning may be, shall fix the rights of
the party").
95. See Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra note 76, at 1134; Friedman, supra note 88,
at 776-77.
96. On the evidentiary function of contract formalities generally, see Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,800 (1941).
97. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 81, § 611, at 1179; Eisenberg, Responsive Model,
supra note 76, at 1109.
98. Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Kozinski, J.).
99. See Fuller, supra note 96, at 800.
100. As Judge Easterbrook has written:
The objective approach is an essential ingredient to allowing the parties jointly
to control the effect of their document. If... secret intents could bind, parties
would become wary, and the written word would lose some of its power. The
ability to fix the consequences with certainty is especially important in
commercial transactions that are planned with care in advance.
Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1987).
101. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933). Interestingly,
Hand took an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation. See Note, Why Learned
Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1006,
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B. Intentionalism in Contract Interpretation
Thus the classical approach. One sees examples of it even now;
indeed, at least one commentator has argued that we are witnessing a
renaissance in classical contract law." z Yet, in significant respects,
contemporary contract interpretation has come to reject the classical
model. 3 Under contemporary principles, contract interpretation is
not principally a search for the objective meaning of a text, but rather
a search for the shared intent of the parties. 1' 4 To be sure, the words
of the parties' written agreement will be probative of their intent; in
most cases, in fact, the words will provide conclusive evidence. But
the goal, as Arthur Corbin once explained, "is the ascertainment of
the intention of the parties (their meaning), and not the meaning that
the written words convey ... to any third persons, few or many,
reasonably intelligent or otherwise.""05  Under contemporary
principles, where extrinsic evidence shows that the parties shared an
intent at odds with the objective meaning of the written agreement,
their intent, not the writing, prevails.'
1012-14 (1992).
102. See Mooney, supra note 77, at 1148-71. For an example of a contemporary case
that advocates the classical approach, see Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 569.
103. See Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra note 76, at 1131-35; Eisenberg, Responsive
Model, supra note 76, at 1110, 1126; see also Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in
Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality As Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L.
REV. 643, 643 (1995) (noting a "continuing trend in which an increasing number of courts
have ... acknowledged that extrinsic evidence relating to context should always be
admissible").
104. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981) ("Where the
parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is
interpreted in accordance with that meaning."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 7.9, at 504 (2d ed. 1990); Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra note 76, at 1134.
105. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 164 (1965); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 951 (1967) ("The object of contract law is to protect the
justifiable expectations of the contracting parties themselves, not those of third parties,
even reasonable third parties.").
106. See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572,576 (7th Cir.
1995) (Posner, J.); Eisenberg, Expression Rules, supra note 76, at 1133-34; Eisenberg,
Responsive Model, supra note 76, at 1126.
A word about the parol evidence rule may be helpful. The rule bars, in certain
circumstances, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict or supplement the
terms of a written agreement. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 93, § 3-2, at 135-36.
In contemporary understanding, the rule does not apply to questions of interpretation:
extrinsic evidence, including the contract's negotiating history, is admissible to show that
the parties shared an intent at odds with the language of the writing. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 104, § 7.12, at 522-23. An earlier view, associated with the classical model,
allowed the introduction of such evidence only where the language of the writing was
ambiguous. See id. § 7.12, at 520-22; see also supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing the classical approach). For an argument that the classical view of the parol
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Again, an illustration may be helpful. Return to the hypothetical
case discussed earlier, in which a written contract provides that Seller
will sell goods to Buyer "F.O.B. the place of destination."'"I 7 Recall
that while trade usage makes clear that the phrase "F.O.B. the place
of destination" signifies that the seller bears the risk of damage to the
goods up to that point, the parties' correspondence reveals that they
intended that Buyer bear that risk. 08 Under the classical approach,
we saw, a court would hold that Seller bears the risk under the
contract.109 Under contemporary principles, the result would be
precisely opposite."0 As the negotiating history makes clear, the
parties' shared intent was that Buyer bear the risk of damage to the
goods during transit. The writing might signify something different
to a reasonable observer; but, in case of conflict, the shared intent of
the parties, not the language of the writing, controls."'
Why this shift in approach? In its rejection of the classical
model, and its embrace of intentionalism, contemporary contract
interpretation reflects the influence of that collection of movements
known as American legal realism.12 Generalizations about realism
are difficult." The realists made a variety of broad, often conflicting
claims about the nature of law and the legal process, some of which
have stood the test of time better than others." With respect to
contract law, though, the realists had a central, and fruitful, insight:
the law should forgo formal abstractions and conform to commercial
evidence rule is making a comeback, see Mooney, supra note 77, at 1148, 1170.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
108. See supra text following note 85.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1981); id.
§ 212.
111. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 7.9, at 504; Eisenberg, Expression Rules,
supra note 76, at 1134.
112. On American legal realism generally, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William
W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993), MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 169-92 (1992), and WILLIAM TWINIG, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
113. Neil Duxbury writes that "[r]ealism was more a mood than a movement." NEIL
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 69 (1995); see also id. at 65
(noting the "indeterminacy" of realism's "conceptual and thematic boundaries"); William
Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 347 (1985) (observing that
"generalizations about [the realists'] ideas are dangerous").
114. See James J. White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 7, 7-15; see also DUXBURY, supra note 113, at 68 ("Legal realists, one of their
number once observed, 'do not constitute a "school" in any useful sense of that term, for
they differ too much among themselves on too many matters.'" (quoting Walter Wheeler
Cook, Book Review, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 1154, 1161 (1935))).
1998] 1163
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
practice.115 In resolving contract disputes, the realists argued, courts
should look to the way people in the market actually behave, and
refrain from applying essentially "autonomous legal conventions.""16
Consider, in this regard, Williston's distinction between a written
and an oral contract."7  Williston, recall, argued for an objective
approach to a written contract on the ground that the parties'
approval of a writing supersedes whatever their intent may have been
in making the underlying agreement."' It is a plausible argument." 9
The problem, as Farnsworth points out, is that there is little evidence
that real-world parties actually view a writing as having an
importance independent of the underlying agreement.2
Accordingly, under contemporary principles, a writing is significant
only as a reflection of the parties' subjective intent: strictly speaking,
the writing is not the contract, but merely evidence of the contract.12'
Under contemporary principles, the parties' shared intent, not their
approval of a written memorial of that intent, "is the operative fact in
[a] contract's creation."'1'
115. See K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 2), 48
YALE L.J. 779, 785 (1939); Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New
Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV.
213, 217-19 (1966); Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 169, 170-71 & n.10 (1989); see also HORWITZ, supra note 112, at 187 ("All Realists
shared one basic premise-that the law had come to be out of touch with reality.").
116. See Eisenberg, Responsive Model, supra note 76, at 1109.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
118. See supra text accompanying note 93.
119. Williston's argument is particularly powerful where the writing includes a
provision, known generically as a "merger clause," that states that the writing constitutes
the parties' "entire agreement." See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 7.3, at 476. The
classical approach honored such clauses, "though in recent years there has been a
tendency to deny such clauses conclusive effect," id.-another example of the shift to
intentionalism.
120. See Farnsworth, supra note 105, at 962 (noting that the "basis for [Williston's]
assumption does not appear").
121. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3, at 12 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 8,
at 17 (3d ed. 1990); Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L.
REV. 41, 54 (1995); John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized
Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1342
(1975).
122. Movsesian, supra note 121, at 55. Indeed, as a general matter, a contract need
not be in writing at all. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) ("A
promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly
from conduct."). In some circumstances, statutes of frauds allow a party to avoid
enforcement of a contract where he has failed to sign a written memorandum of its
contents. See id. § 110; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 6.8, at 435 (discussing
signature requirement). But the contract still exists: a party who has failed to sign a
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The realists also understood that an intentionalist approach,
wisely applied, does not impair the security of transactions.
Examining the negotiating history of a traditional contract, with two
parties and a limited subject matter, will not ordinarily present a
court, or litigants, with great burdens.'23  Allowing parties to
introduce evidence of prior negotiations, moreover, does not mean
that such evidence will necessarily trump the written agreement. The
more remote the interpretation suggested, the more persuasive the
evidence must be; at some point, as Corbin observed, a prudent court
will "cease listening to testimony that white is black and that a dollar
is fifty cents." 24 Finally, the notion that an objective approach will
encourage business planning, and thereby prevent contract disputes
from arising, is doubtful. What empirical evidence there is, as
Eisenberg points out, "strongly suggests that private actors, taken as
a class, have little or no significant knowledge of contract law."'" In
written memorandum can enforce a contract against a party who has. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 104, § 6.8, at 435; see also id. § 6.10, at 445 (noting that an agreement that fails
to comply with the statute of frauds is still a "contract"). For more on these matters, see
Movsesian, supra note 121, at 54 n.92.
123. An important body of scholarship argues that the traditional model reflects a
limited understanding of the nature of contract in the real world. A truer model, it
teaches, is the "relational" contract: an agreement that comprises multiple subjects and
numerous parties with vague, evolving goals. See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context,
Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139, 155-60; Richard E.
Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 789, 798-804
(1993). The leading exponent of this view of contract is Ian Macneil. See IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 10-35 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures
of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589,595-96 (1974).
Whether relational-contract scholarship correctly critiques the traditional model is
beyond the scope of this Article. As I have explained elsewhere, though, the relational-
contract model does approximate legislation to a much greater degree than the traditional
model, and some analogies between the interpretation of relational contracts and statutes
may exist. See Movsesian, supra note 121, at 71 n.191; see also Strauss, supra note 7, at
328 (suggesting analogy between some statutes and relational contracts); Taylor,
Textualism at Work, supra note 6, at 319 n.250 ("If the analogy between contract and
statutory interpretation were to be pursued, it would be worthwhile to analyze concepts of
relational contract .... "). The key question, in my view, would be whether relational
contracts raise the same concerns about notice to third parties that statutes do. See infra
Part III.B (discussing statutes' effect on third parties).
124. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 623 (1944); cf.
Corbin, supra note 105, at 170-71 (distinguishing "interpretation" and "contradiction" of
a writing). Some intentionalist courts have required that the extrinsic evidence be
"'relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible.'" Kniffin, supra note 103, at 653 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968)). Others have permitted
the introduction of extrinsic evidence without this restriction. See id. at 660.
125. Eisenberg, Responsive Model, supra note 76, at 1109.
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the real world, most parties are unaware of the incentives the
classical model purports to create.
To be sure, not all parties are so ignorant. Many are
sophisticated businesspeople; many, too, retain counsel who can
explain to them the rules of classical contract interpretation. Even if
parties know those rules, though-even if they pay close attention to
the words of the written agreement-the realities of communication
suggest that they will occasionally miss the mark. Words, however
carefully negotiated, may fail to capture the essence of an
agreement.126  And here one must appreciate another important
insight that underlies contemporary contract interpretation: a
contract binds only the parties who make it." Third persons remain
unaffected. A contract cannot impose obligations upon them,12 nor
can it confer benefits upon them where they object.129 In the context
of a contract dispute-putting aside for the moment the matter of
third-party beneficiaries13 ---third persons are simply disinterested
bystanders.
As a consequence, an intentionalist approach to contract
interpretation is entirely appropriate. Objectivism would make a
great deal of sense if a contract were directed at third persons. By
assigning the words of a contract the meaning that a reasonable
observer would give them, a court would protect the expectations of
persons who might rely on the language the parties had used. But, as
a contract does not bind third persons, a court need not worry about
those expectations: there is no danger that strangers to the
transaction will be misled by a contract's language, or surprised by
126. Even under the classical model, courts could reform a writing in case of certain
errors in expression-typographical or computational mistakes, for example. See, e.g., 3
WILLISTON, supra note 81, §§ 1547-1549; see also Holmes, supra note 6, at 420
(distinguishing between "construction" and "avoidance" of contract). On the equitable
remedy of reformation today, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155, and
FARNSwORTH, supra note 104, § 7.5. See also Slawson, supra note 6, at 423-24
(describing reformation in contract law and suggesting possible analogy in statutory
interpretation).
127. See Movsesian, supra note 121, at 45, 53.
128. See id. at 53 & nn.81-82. A party to a contract can promise action on the part of a
third person, of course. In such a case, the third person has no contractual obligation: in
the event of breach, the promisee's action lies against the promisor himself. See 1
CORBIN, supra note 121, § 1.13, at 36-37.
129. "A beneficiary who has not previously assented to the promise for his benefit
may in a reasonable time after learning of its existence and terms render any duty to
himself inoperative from the beginning by disclaimer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 306; see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 93, § 17-11, at 715.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 174-83 (discussing third-party beneficiary
contracts).
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the parties' secret agreement.131 As Farnsworth puts it, contemporary
contract law properly seeks "to protect the justifiable expectations of
the contracting parties themselves, not those of third parties, even
reasonable third parties.' 132
IH. THE FAILURE OFTHE CONTRACr ANALOGY
Having examined the elements of contract interpretation, we are
now in a position to appreciate the failure of the contract analogy in
statutory interpretation. As this Part demonstrates, statutes and
contracts differ in fundamental ways; their interpretation cannot be
assimilated. Exploring why this is so sheds light on the essential
qualities of both statutes and contracts. In addition, as we shall see, a
comparison of contract and statutory interpretation illuminates a
number of difficult and timely questions, including the character of
third-party beneficiary contracts,' 33  the nature of political
representation,134 and the role of bicameralism and presentment in
our constitutional system.'35 It also provides a richer context for
evaluating the ongoing debate about the appropriate use of
legislative history in determining the meaning of statutory
language. 6
A. An Illustration: Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
Once again, an illustration may help to focus discussion. One
need not look far. Consider Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States,'137 one of the most famous-or, depending on one's view of
things, infamous-cases in the history of American statutory
interpretation. 38 At issue was a federal statute that made it unlawful
131. See Movsesian, supra note 121, at 53.
132. Farnsworth, supra note 105, at 951.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 174-83.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 184-209.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 233-52.
137. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
138. Church of the Holy Trinity is "[t]he earliest Supreme Court case commonly cited
for the use of legislative history to construe a statute." Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain
Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 401, 434 n.132 (1994). The commentary on the case is extensive. See, e.g.,
REED DICKERSON, TE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 80 (1975);
ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 208-09, 210; MIKvA & LANE, supra note 43, at 828-34;
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 629 (1990);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 360-62 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to
the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241,
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to encourage or assist the immigration of an alien "'under contract
... to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States.' "139
The United States brought a prosecution under the act against the
Church of the Holy Trinity, an Episcopal church located in New
York City."4 The church had entered into an employment contract
with one E. Walpole Warren, "an alien residing in England," the
terms of which provided that Warren would move to New York and
take up a position as the church's rector. 4' The circuit court held
that the contract fell within the terms of the act and allowed the
prosecution to proceed. 42
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed. 143  The
Court conceded that the church's contract with Warren fell within the
express terms of the statute. "[T]he relation of rector to his church is
one of service," the Court observed, and the statutory prohibition
applied to contracts "'to perform labor or service of any kind.' "
247 (1992); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 767, 769 (1991); William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory
Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 879 (1993); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 3, 18-23;
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 986-87 (1995); Adrian
Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 542-50.
139. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164,
§ 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332, repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(2), 66 Stat. 163,
279-80). In full, section 1 of the act provided:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in
any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or
foreigners, into the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia,
under contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous
to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to
perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or the
District of Columbia.
Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. at 332.
140. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458. The prosecution was apparently
"a nonadversarial suit" designed "to test the applicability of the statute." Vermeule,
supra note 138, at 7. On the church's denomination, see Daniel A. Farber, The
Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 513, 514 n.7 (1996) (book review).
141. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458. The church also provided for
Warren's transportation to the United States. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 138, at
360.
142. See United States v. Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 303-06
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888), rev'd, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
143. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472.
144. Id. at 458 (emphasis added) (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. at
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Yet it was "a familiar rule," the Court continued, "that a thing may
be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.' 1 45
It was "absurd" to suppose that Congress had intended to criminalize
contracts for the employment of foreign clergy. 46 Americans were "a
religious people," and Congress could not have meant "to make it a
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services
of a Christian minister residing in another nation."47
In addition, the Court believed, the legislative history revealed
that the legislators had not intended such a result."' Records of
committee hearings on the legislation, for example, suggested that
the legislators' goal had been to exclude unskilled workers. 49 The
committees had heard testimony that the immigration of "'an
ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers'" was driving down
domestic wages; 50 no one, the Court noted, had testified that the
United States possessed "a surplus of brain toilers," or that the
American market for Christian ministers "was depressed by foreign
competition."'' The report of the House Committee on Labor,
moreover, addressed only the problem of unskilled immigrants, and
their" 'tendency ... to degrade American labor, and ... reduce it to
the level of ... imported pauper labor.' "'52
332). In addition, the Court noted, the statute made exceptions for "professional actors,
artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants," thereby "strengthen[ing] the idea that
every other kind of labor and service was intended to be reached." Id. at 458-59.
145. Id. at 459.
146. See id. A traditional canon teaches that a court should refrain from giving a
statute its literal meaning where doing so would produce "absurd" results. See Public
Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989). For more on this aspect of Church of
the Holy Trinity, see Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism:
Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127,
136 & n.36 (1994), Farber, supra note 140, at 514 & n.7 (tracing the origin of the absurd-
results canon in American law to Church of the Holy Trinity), and Symposium, supra note
1, at 872 (comments of Bill Eskridge). See also infra text accompanying notes 259-63
(discussing the absurd-results canon and its possible application to Church of the Holy
Trinity).
147. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465, 471; see also id. at 471 (noting that
"this is a Christian nation"). On the controversial nature of the Court's reasoning on this
point, see Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 473-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment),
and Eskridge, supra note 138, at 629 n.30.
148. For an argument that the Court misread the legislative history in Church of the
Holy Trinity, see Vermeule, supra note 138, at 5, 13-26.
149. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464.
150. Id. at 463 (quoting United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1886)).
For a summary of testimony before the House Committee on Labor, see 15 CONG. REC.
6065-67 (1884) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.48-444 app. at 8-12 (1884)).
151. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464.
152. Id at 465 (quoting 15 CONG. REC at 5359 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 48-444 at 2)).
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An even more "singular circumstance, throwing light upon the
intent of Congress," appeared in the report of the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor.153 That report demonstrated that, despite
the clear import of the statutory text, the committee had intended the
act to apply only to unskilled labor. The report acknowledged that
the phrase "labor or service" might be too broad, given the
legislation's objectives, and that an amendment narrowing the
statute's application to "'manual labor' or 'manual service'" might
be desirable. 54 But such an amendment would have delayed
enactment, and the committee, on the understanding that the statute
would" 'be construed as including only those whose labor or service
is manual in character,' "had" 'reported the bill without change.' "155
Church of the Holy Trinity provides a good illustration of the
contract analogies described in Part V u 6 In McNollgast's version,
recall, a court must search a statute's legislative history for implicit
agreements among veto players, relating to interpretation and other
matters, that underlie the statutory text. 57 In that way, a court can
discover and give effect to the bargain the veto players actually
"thought they were making."5 8 While the notion of veto players
would have been foreign to it, the Court conducted just such a search
in Church of the Holy Trinity. Approval by the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor was surely a crucial step in the statute's
adoption-a veto gate, as it were-and the committee's report
demonstrated' that the members understood that the statute would
In introducing the bill in the House, Representative Foran explained that "[ilts object"
was to prevent employers "from importing into this country large bodies of foreign
laborers to take the places of and crowd out American laborers." 15 CONG. REc. at 5349(statement of Rep. Foran); see also id. at 5358 (statement of Rep. O'Neill) (explaining
that the bill's purpose was to "prevent[] pauper laborers from being brought here from
abroad for the purpose of breaking down the efforts of the workingmen of this country to
secure their just rights").
153. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464. For the full text of the report, see S.
REP. No. 48-820 (1884).
154. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464 (quoting 15 CONG. REc. at 6059(quoting S. REP. No. 48-820 at 1)); see also 15 CONG. REC. at 6059 (statement of Sen.
Blair) (discussing the Senate Report).
155. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-65 (quoting 15 CONG. REC. at 6059(quoting S. REP. No. 48-820 at 1)). The legislation's scope occasioned considerable
discussion in the Senate. See 16 CONG. REc. at 1622-25, 1633, 1635-36 (1885).
156. I am not the first to note an interesting irony. Church of the Holy Trinity adopted
an intentionalist approach-the approach of today's contract law-at a time when
contract law itself stressed objectivity and the formal text. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 1,
at 209; see also supra Part II.A (discussing classical contract interpretation).
157. See supra Part L.A (discussing McNollgast).
158. McNollgast, supra note 6, at 7.
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apply only to manual labor.159  Consulting the legislative history
allowed the Court to "choose the interpretation that would have been
chosen by" the statute's "enacting coalition."'60
Recall, too, Farber's discussion of legislation that "resolve[s]
important conflicting interests between groups of individuals."''
Farber argues that a court considering such legislation should pay
close attention to the legislative history, as that is the approach the
risk-averse drafters would favor. 62 One can see the immigration
statute at issue in Church of the Holy Trinity as just such
legislation: 63  legislation that resolved a conflict among various
management and labor interests over the recruitment and
employment of foreign workers. 64 On this view, the Court did
exactly what Farber believes it should have done. It examined the
statute's legislative history to make sure that it correctly understood
the compromise the drafters had reached.
B. Statutes and Third Parties
The question, though, is whether contract analogies like
McNoUgast's and Farber's are appropriate. They are not. Contracts
and statutes are fundamentally different sorts of legal texts; the
intentionalist approach of contract law is incongruous in the context
of statutory interpretation. Recall, for example, one persuasive
argument for intentionalism in contract interpretation. As we saw in
Part II, a contract binds only the parties who make it: a contract can
159. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
160. McNollgast, supra note 1, at 738.
161. Farber, supra note 5, at 684.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
163. Farber cautions that his article does not address circumstances where the
legislators "simply failIl to consider a possible situation." Farber, supra note 5, at 669.
Because the legislators "had a particular situation in mind and adopted language
addressing it," id., I take it that Church of the Holy Trinity presents the sort of
interpretive problem that Farber's article does address.
164. Its Senate sponsor claimed that the bill was
designed to prevent the combination of capital for the purpose of introducing
into the American civilization, in direct collision and competition with the
ordinary American producer, a foreigner who can not naturally get here, who is
brought here by a combination of capital for the express and sole purpose of
reducing the natural and ordinary compensation which the American laborer is
to receive for his toil.
16 CONG REC. at 1626 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair). For more on the "interest"
nature of the legislation, see id. at 1622 (colloquy between Sens. Blair and Hawley), itL at
1632 (statement of Sen. Morgan), id. at 1785 (statement of Sen. Call), and id. at 1793
(statement of Sen. Morgan). See also United States v. Rector of the Church of the Holy
Trinity, 36 F. 303, 304 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888) (describing the objectives of the legislation's
advocates), rev'd, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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neither impose obligations on third persons nor confer benefits on
them where they object.'65 Concerns about notice to third persons
are therefore unnecessary. A contract is not directed at outsiders,
and a court need not worry that the language might create
expectations, or encourage reliance, on the part of strangers to the
transaction. 66
A statute is directed at third persons, however. That is the
essential point about a statute. A statute is not a private
arrangement that affects only the legislators who enact it, or the
convenient memorial of an inside deal among members of a
legislative coalition. Rather, a statute is a public document that
establishes rules of conduct for persons outside the legislature-rules
those persons must follow, in some instances, on pain of fine or
imprisonment.167  Notice to third persons is thus of critical
importance. If a statute is to guide the conduct of people outside the
legislature, those people must know what the statute requires. 68
Fairness counsels that they not be held to the terms of an implicit
understanding that fails to appear in the statutory text.1 69
Now, one might object to an attempt to draw a distinction
between contracts and statutes on the basis of third-party effects. 70
165. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
166. See supra text accompanying note 131; see also Movsesian, supra note 121, at 53
(arguing that a court interpreting a contract "need not worry about expectations the
contract's language may create in the minds of strangers to the transaction").
167. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 326 (1993) (describing statute as a "political
document"); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 441,447 (1990) ("Laws are designed to control the conduct of strangers to
the transaction[]."); Movsesian, supra note 121, at 67; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 952 (1983) (describing the "essentially legislative" character of a provision that "had
the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons ...
outside the Legislative Branch").
168. See Easterbrook, supra note 167, at 447; Movsesian, supra note 121, at 68.
169. See Movsesian, supra note 121, at 69. "Statutes are thought to be rules 'to which
individuals may refer for guidance in planning their conduct, and private citizens can
hardly be expected to make reference to committee reports and other legislative
records."' OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 51 (1989) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
(quoting Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2,21 (1939)); cf. Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 138, at 340 (noting "rule-of-law value that citizens ought to be able to read the
statute books and know their rights and duties"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 57 (1994) (noting "traditional rule-of-law view that statutory text should be the
key source of statutory meaning").
170. McNollgast does object, though only in an aside. The asserted difference
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Some contracts do affect third persons, after all: familiar doctrine
allows "third-party beneficiaries" to enforce contract provisions.171
Perhaps courts should view statutes as third-party beneficiary
contracts, made by legislators for the benefit of the public, and
interpret them accordingly. Alternatively, one might question
whether members of the public should be seen as "third parties" at
all. The public elects its legislators; as a result, one might view
legislators as their constituents' "agents."172 Principals are normally
bound by what their agents understand in the context of a contract
negotiation. 73 Perhaps members of the public should be bound by
what their legislators understand as well.
Neither of these objections is ultimately very persuasive. Take
first the analogy to third-party beneficiary contracts. As the name
suggests, these are contracts made for the benefit of non-parties:
contracts in which a promisor agrees to perform a service for a non-
party,174 for example, or agrees to pay a debt the promisee owes to
someone else.175 Under present law, non-parties have the right to
enforce such contracts.176 If the promisor fails to perform the service,
"between market exchange and legislative exchange," McNollgast writes, "is less one of
kind than of quantitative magnitude, for third-party effects or economic externalities are
an explicit part of the law governing market transactions." McNollgast, supra note 1, at
739.
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14 (1981); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 104, § 10.3; MURRAY, supra note 121, at 751-83. For a history of the law
governing third-party beneficiaries, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party
Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1358, 1360-74 (1992), and Anthony Jon Waters, The
Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1116-72 (1985).
172 See infra text accompanying notes 184-85.
173. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides an illustration: "A, as agent for P,
enters into a written contract with T, knowing that T does not understand the instrument
and that it does not correspond to the agreement to which T consents. P is bound by A's
knowledge and cannot enforce the contract against T." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 272 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1958); see also id. § 144 cmt. d ("The principal is subject to
liability upon a contract made by the agent acting within his authority to the same extent
as if the contract had been made by him in person."); id. § 272 cmt. a (stating that liability
of the principal may be affected by the agent's knowledge where the agent makes a
contract for the principal).
174. In these circumstances, the non-party is sometimes referred to as a "donee
beneficiary." See Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1389. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts avoids the use of this term on the ground that it is confusing. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14 introductory note.
175. In these circumstances, the non-party is sometimes referred to as a "creditor
beneficiary." See Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1391. Again, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts abandons this term to avoid confusion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 14 introductory note.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304; FARNSWORTH, supra note
104, § 10.7, at 765. Of course, the promisee retains an independent right against the
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or fails to pay the debt, the third-party beneficiary can bring suit
against the promisor for breach. 7  But the parties to the contract
must have intended to confer a "right to performance in the
beneficiary."'78 "Incidental beneficiaries"--those not within the
contemplation of the parties-cannot bring suit to enforce the
contract. 79
Whether the parties to a contract intended to confer a right to
performance in non-parties is a matter of interpretation to be
resolved, generally speaking, in conformity with the principles
discussed in Part 11 But third-party beneficiary contracts present a
problem in this regard that other contracts do not. Because they
affect the interests of persons other than the parties, third-party
beneficiary contracts create the potential for unfair surprise. Third
persons, who presumably lack information about private
understandings between the parties, may rely on the contract's
language in planning their own affairs. In these circumstances, giving
priority to the shared intent of the parties poses the risk of substantial
hardship.
As a result, the intentionalism of contemporary contract
interpretation is relaxed a bit when it comes to third-party
beneficiary contracts. Courts do attempt to discover, as a general
promisor. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 10.7, at 767.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 cmt. d ("Where the
promisee manifests an intention to make a gift of the promised performance to a
beneficiary ... the beneficiary has available for his own benefit the usual remedies for
breach of contract."); id. § 304 cmt. c ("Where the performance of the promise will satisfy
an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary ... the beneficiary is
allowed a direct action against the promisor without joining the promisee.").
178. Id. § 302(1). Courts have differed on whether one or both parties must intend to
confer a benefit on the third party. See Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the
Intent Requirement in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 67, 73-74;
see also Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1378 ("The test in most common use has been
whether the promisee-or, in some formulations, the parties to the contract-intended to
benefit the third-party beneficiary."). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests
that both parties must intend to confer a benefit on the third party, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302; FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 10.3, at 749, and I
refer to that test here. But cf Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1382-83 (arguing that the
Restatement (Second) is unclear whether one or both parties must intend to confer
benefit); David M. Summers, Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 880, 895-96 (1982) (same).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. e, § 315.
180. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 10.3, at 752-54; see also supra Part II.B
(discussing contemporary contract interpretation). Some courts apparently require that
the "intent to benefit the third party be found in the language of the contract itself,"
Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1379, though this view is out of keeping with modern
contract doctrine, see id.
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matter, the shared intent of the parties.'8 ' But they also take into
account the possibility that the contract's language might create
expectations on the part of non-parties.1 1 Indeed, the commentary
to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts advises that, whatever the
intention of the parties, a third party can enforce a contract where he
"would be reasonable in relying on [it] as manifesting an intention to
confer a right on him."'" Objectivism thus plays a significant role in
the interpretation of third-party beneficiary contracts: if anything,
the analogy to such contracts counsels against importing
intentionalism wholesale into statutory interpretation.
What about the claim that legislators should be seen as their
constituents' "agents"? On this understanding, members of the
public are not third parties, but principals: persons who have
engaged others to negotiate contracts in their behalf and who are
bound, in matters of interpretation, by what their agents actually
understand. 84 It is, in some ways, a compelling vision. We expect,
after all, that our legislators will act in our behalf-that they will, in
questions of policy, consult our interests and behave accordingly.185
181. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 10.3, at 752-54; see also Eisenberg, supra
note 171, at 1379 (stating that better-reasoned cases reject the idea that intent to benefit a
third party must be found in the language of the contract itself); Harry G. Prince,
Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule Under Section 302 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919, 930 (1984) (noting that many courts allow
extrinsic evidence of intent to benefit a third party); cf. Summers, supra note 178, at 898
(arguing that intent to benefit a third party need not appear in an express contractual
provision). Courts have not been uniform on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of
intent to benefit the third party. See Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1379.
182. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, § 10.3, at 756; see also Michael B. Metzger &
Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 42 Sw. L.J. 931, 948 (1988)
("[M]ost ... courts specifically considering the matter allow a third party's reliance to
play some role in determining that party's rights under the contract.").
183. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d. The commentary's lack
of clarity has caused some consternation. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 171, at 1383-84;
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 182, at 947-48; Prince, supra note 181, at 987-90. Note that
actual reliance by the third-party beneficiary is not required. See Eisenberg, supra note
171, at 1383.
184. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. McNollgast makes a similar argument
with regard to the relationship between legislators and the legislative leadership. See
McNollgast, supra note 6, at 11 n.23, 19-20. At one point, McNollgast argues that the
relationship between legislators and the leadership is akin to that between shareholders
and corporate managers. See id. at 19-20. I discuss the shareholder metaphor further.
See infra notes 188,209.
185. As Belloc and Chesterton observed,
Either the representative must vote as his constituents would vote if consulted,
or he must vote in the opposite sense. In the latter case, he is not a
representative at all, but merely an oligarch; for it is surely ridiculous to say that
a man represents Bethnal Green if he is in the habit of saying "Aye" when the
people of Bethnal Green would say "No."
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But the nature of legislative representation is in fact far more
complicated 8  Difficulties inherent in the relationship between
legislator and constituent make the agency metaphor inapposite.
The difficulties have to do with the potential for shirking by
legislators.'17 In some sense, of course, these difficulties exist in every
agency relationship. There is always a risk that the interests of
principal and agent will diverge, and that the agent will attempt to
advance his own, rather than his principal's, goals.88 That is why,
HILAIRE BELLOC & CECIL CHESTERTON, THE PARTY SYSTEM 17 (1911). One irate
constituent admonished his congressman in similar terms: "'We didn't send you to
Washington to make intelligent decisions. We sent you to represent us.'" ROGER H.
DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 9 (5th ed. 1996).
186. There is, of course, a longstanding conceptual debate on the nature of political
representation. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 4
(1967) (characterizing the debate as a "vexing and seemingly endless controversy");
Levmore, supra note 6, at 567 (noting the "old and familiar debate"). See generally
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 503-07 (discussing nature of representative
relationship). One theory-what Pitkin calls the "mandate" theory-holds that
legislators must follow, without variation, the wishes of their constituents. See PITKIN,
supra, at 145. Another, associated most prominently with Edmund Burke, teaches that
legislators must exercise independent judgment in deciding what will best serve the
interests of their constituents. See Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in
EDMUND BURKE ON GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 156, 157 (B.W. Hill ed.,
1976) ("Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion."); see also Levmore,
supra note 6, at 567 (discussing Burke's notion of "trusteeship"). Pitkin argues
persuasively for an intermediate formulation that combines elements of both these
theories. See PITKIN, supra, at 209-10 (arguing that a representative must act so that
there is normally no "conflict between representative and represented about what is to be
done").
For our purposes, it is unnecessary to settle this debate. Whatever the conceptual
resolution, there exist practical difficulties that distinguish political representation from
the standard agency model. See infra text accompanying notes 187-209. It is perhaps
instructive to note, though, if only as an aside, that Burke's attempt to put his theory into
practice cost him his parliamentary seat. See CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE GREAT
MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND
BURKE 71-86 (1992) (recounting how Burke's unpopular views on policy toward Ireland
forced him to withdraw his candidacy for reelection).
187. I use the term "shirking" to refer to an agent's acting in accord with his own
preferences rather than those of his principal. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at
27; Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 282 (1984) (citing Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777 (1972)). Some scholars use the term to refer to an agent's simple neglect of his
duties-slacking. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1471 (1989); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 60 n.45 (1982).
188. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1427 n.61 (1985); Eisenberg, supra note 187, at 1471;
see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 9-11 (1991) (discussing agency costs in context of firm). Indeed, the
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among other reasons, the law gives the principal an absolute right of
control over the agent: unlike other fiduciaries, agents must always
follow instructions and remain subject to dismissal at any time.189
Indeed, as Victor Brudney has observed, traditional agency law
assumes that the principal will continually monitor the agent's
activities and remain "involve[d] ... in the operation of the
enterprise."9 0
The difficulties are far more serious in the context of political
representation, however. The incentives for shirking by legislators
are great, and the capacity for effective control by constituents, small.
Take first the incentives for legislators. Even if one rejects the more
dismal versions of public choice theory, which hold that legislators
simply sell their votes to well-funded interest groups,'9 ' the factors
that go into legislators' voting decisions are much more complicated
than the agency model suggests. 92 Constituents' views undoubtedly
are important. 93 But legislators' decisions are subject to many other
proper response to this risk in the shareholder-manager relationship is a question that
occupies much contemporary corporations scholarship. See Manuel A. Utset, Towards a
Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 540, 550 n.32 (1995) (collecting
authorities); infra note 209.
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 & cmt. a (1958); id. § 118 cmt. b;
HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 5, at 12 (2d ed. 1990); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders:
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1038
(1996). The agent retains the right to bring an action for wrongful discharge. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 118 cmt. b.
190. Brudney, supra note 188, at 1428. Brudney describes "the classic agency
relationship" as one "in which the principal is familiar with the scope of, and often
actively monitors, the agent's discretion." Id. at 1429.
191. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 23 (describing public choice models);
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 495 ("Legislators are depicted as mere salespeople of votes.");
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 877 ("In short, legislation is 'sold' by the legislature and
'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation."). "Payment takes the form of campaign
contributions ... implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes."
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 877. The starker interest-group theories of legislation
are subject to increasing question. See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 491 n.49 (collecting
authorities). Even so, it seems clear that interest groups play a significant role in the
legislative process. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 24 & n.52.
192. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 21, 33 (discussing legislators'
interconnected goals); PITKIN, supra note 186, at 219-21 (same). For one attempt to
order the complexity, see JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 242-
81 (3d ed. 1989).
193. See KINGDON, supra note 192, at 67-68; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43,
at 503 ("What can be observed is that legislators reflect the dominant attitudes and status
of their constituents and believe they are responsible for expressing the same in the
legislative arena."); Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-
Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 684 & n.202 (1996) (arguing that legislators' voting
records "appear[] to be relatively consistent with [their] constituents' interests").
11771998]
1178 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
influences as well:194 concerns about loyalty to colleagues,' demands
of the party leadership, 96 criticism from the media,'9 and the
persuasions of interest groups. 9 The legislators' ideology and moral
commitments may also play a large role.199
With respect to any given vote, one or more of these factors
might outweigh the interests of a legislator's constituents. How to
keep the legislator honest? In the classic agency relationship, the
principal would provide detailed instructions and keep a close watch;
if the agent neglected his duty, the principal would fire him.200 But
our constitutional system rejects the idea that constituents can
"'instruct' " their legislators.201  Moreover, collective-action
194. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 503 ("A legislator may ... have a variety
of allegiances, concerns, and sensibilities on any given issue that he or she factors into the
making of a particular decision."); PITKIN, supra note 186, at 219 ("The modern
representative acts within an elaborate network of pressures, demands, and obligations.").
195. See KINGDON, supra note 192, at 105-06; PITKIN, supra note 186, at 220. Speaker
Sam Rayburn once observed that "'[a] congressman has two constituencies-he has his
constituents at home, and his colleagues here in the House.'" DAVIDSON & OLESZEK,
supra note 185, at 7.
196. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 270-74; PITKIN, supra note 186, at
220. In the congressional context, "[p]arty affiliation is the strongest single correlate of
members' voting decisions, and in recent years it has reached surprisingly high levels."
DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 270. Opinions differ on whether party
cohesion derives from leadership tactics or other factors. See id. at 273-74. Kingdon, for
example, has argued that the leadership's role is not "particularly important." KINGDON,
supra note 192, at 142.
197. See KINGDON, supra note 192, at 222-23. While the media may not be direct
factors in congressmen's voting decisions, Kingdon argues, they may have substantial
indirect effect, particularly in setting the legislative agenda. See id.
198. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 24; see also Hamilton, supra note 7, at
495-96 nn.63-64 (collecting authorities acknowledging the importance of interest groups
in the legislative process). But cf MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS 59
(1981) ("Interest groups tend to be regarded seriously only when they are constituency
based .... "); Garrett, supra note 193, at 684-85 ("Although interest groups play
prominent roles in the political process, those that exert the greatest influence ... appear
to have agendas that reflect the interests of the lawmaker's constituents.").
199. See, e.g., DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 276-77; FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 6, at 27, 29-33; PITKIN, supra note 186, at 220. Indeed, Judge Abner Mikva
and my colleague Eric Lane write that, in their experience, "legislators first respond to
proposed legislation on the basis of their own policy views and then, when appropriate,
refract them through other relevant prisms such as constituent and party demands. On
what basis a decision is made depends on the intensity of each factor." MIKVA & LANE,
supra note 43, at 503-04. Of course, it is often "tempting to embrace beliefs that are also
in one's self-interest." FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 46.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
201. "The Framers rejected the idea of allowing the people to 'instruct' their
representatives and, since their time, attempts by state legislatures to instruct senators
have never been binding." Levmore, supra note 6, at 592; see also id. at 592-93 n.54
(discussing attempts by state legislatures to instruct legislators).
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problems prevent constituents from exercising much effective
control.2°2 One person's vote can do very little to affect an outcome
that depends on the combined votes of millions, after all, and anyway
most legislative decisions will have relatively little impact on one's
daily life.20
As a result, most people, most of the time, lack incentives to
obtain the information necessary to monitor their legislator's
conduct. 2°4 The hard facts of contemporary politics bear this out.
Fewer than half of eligible voters participate in congressional
elections2 0-- fewer than forty percent in off years2 6-- and studies
consistently show that large numbers are mistaken with regard to
their legislators' stands on issues .20  As John McGinnis has written,
"[c]itizens have projects other than democratic deliberation and,
given the choice, few spend a large amount of time considering social
policy."2 One must assume, of course, in the absence of some other
indication, that most people remain reasonably content with their
government. The point, though, is that the active involvement
necessary to sustain an agency relationship simply does not exist.0 9
202. For more on collective-action problems in politics, see FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 6, at 23, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 9-16 (1971),
and MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 17-35 (1982) [hereinafter
OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE].
203. For excellent treatments of these concepts, see John 0. McGinnis, The Once and
Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 125-26
(1996), and John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1751,
1755-56, 1791-93 (1994) (book review) [hereinafter McGinnis, Partial Republican].
204. See OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 202, at 26. Some people, of course,
will find it useful to obtain information about legislative matters. As Olson writes,
"[p]oliticians, lobbyists, journalists, and social scientists"-not to mention law
professors--"may earn more money, power, or prestige from knowledge of this or that
public business." Id. Knowledge about public affairs may have independent
entertainment value. See id.; see also McGinnis, Partial Republican, supra note 203, at
1792 n.140 (noting that "most people follow news for its entertainment value").
205. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 99 (noting that "fewer than half of
voting-age citizens take part in House elections in presidential years").
206. See id.
207. "Researchers have found that a large portion of those claiming to know House
incumbents' stands on issues are wrong and that respondents resort mainly to guesswork
when asked to place House or Senate candidates on a liberal-conservative scale." Id. at
110.
208. McGinnis, Partial Republican, supra note 203, at 1791. Most citizens remain, in
other words, "'rationally ignorant' about public affairs." OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE,
supra note 202, at 26.
209. Some of the problems I discuss here arise also in the context of another "agency"
relationship: the relationship between shareholders and managers of a corporation. See
Brudney, supra note 188, at 1428-30; Greenwood, supra note 189, at 1038-43. Other
constraints, though, including the takeover market and compensation structures, can
operate in that context to discipline shirking managers. See Utset, supra note 188, at 551,
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The reader who has come this far might agree that statutes differ
from contracts with respect to third-party effects, but still be left with
a lingering question. Is it worthwhile, in the end, to concern
ourselves with expectations that statutory language might create on
the part of the public?210 After all, most people do not read statutes
on their own. They hire lawyers to explain statutory language to
them, and lawyers presumably know enough to consult legislative
history to determine what the legislature actually intended.2
Perhaps, then, we ought not worry too much about holding members
of the public to the terms of implicit agreements that fail to appear in
the statutory text. Lawyers will ensure that members of the public
are neither surprised nor misled.
This is a fair point, but ultimately not too persuasive. Of course
members of the public rely on lawyers to explain statutory
requirements. But those lawyers are themselves members of the
public. They are intermediaries, not lawmakers: when it comes to
legislation, lawyers and their clients are all third parties attempting to
understand what the legislature has done.2 12 Moreover, the claim that
553 & nn.44-46.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
211. See Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1057, 1057, 1059 (1995); see also Slawson, supra note 6, at 420 ("Laws in our society are
read and interpreted almost exclusively by lawyers. Others obtain their understanding of
the law from them.").
212. Many of the legislators are themselves lawyers, of course, see Allan Freedman,
Lawyers Take a Back Seat in the 105th Congress, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 27, 29 (Jan. 4,
1997) (noting that roughly 40% of members of 105th Congress are lawyers); see also 51
CONG. Q. ALMANAC B-8 (1995) (noting that lawyers comprise "the biggest single
occupational group in Congress"); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on
Judicial Interpretations'of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1,
49 n.194 (1994) (discussing the percentages of lawyers in past Congresses), and all have
staff that can monitor and explain the impact of court decisions on statutory
interpretation, see Brudney, supra, at 49 (noting that in evaluating case law, many
members "rely on the initiative and judgment of their... staff").
This highlights yet another difference between contract and statutory interpretation.
As we have seen, contemporary contract law rejects the claim that objectivism creates
incentives for deliberation and careful drafting. See supra text accompanying note 125.
Incentives can work only where people know they exist, and most people are unfamiliar
with the rules of contract law. See supra text accompanying note 125. Members of
Congress, by contrast, do possess significant legal knowledge and can respond to judicial
signals. See Brudney, supra, at 49 n.194; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (concluding from
empirical survey "that Congress and its committees are aware of the Court's statutory
decisions, devote significant efforts toward analyzing their policy implications, and
override those decisions with a frequency heretofore unreported"). As a result, the
incentives argument is much stronger in the statutory context. But cf. Abner J. Mikva,
Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITr. L. REv. 627, 629 (1987) ("When I was in
Congress, the only 'canons' we talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that
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lawyers should search legislative history for indications of legislative
intent raises a number of other concerns-concerns addressed in the
next section of this Article.
C. The Problematic Concept of Legislative Intent
The existence of third-party effects is not the only factor that
distinguishes statutory from contract interpretation. Another is the
problematic nature of legislative intent. Seeking the "intent of the
parties" to a legislative "bargain" raises formal and practical
difficulties that do not exist in contract interpretation. To begin, the
fact that there is a written text takes on far greater significance. In
contract law, recall, a writing has importance only as a memorial of
the parties' intent. It has no independent authority: under
contemporary principles, the writing is not the contract, but merely
evidence of the contract.213
A statute, by contrast, does not exist apart from the written text.
A statute is the written text.214  This follows from constitutional
requirements. While the Constitution confers legislative power on
Congress,215 it does not, in Max Radin's words, authorize legislators
to "impose their will ... on their fellow-citizens.1 216  Rather, the
could not shoot straight.").
213. See supra text accompanying note 121.
214. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Statutes
are law, not evidence of law."); Movsesian, supra note 121, at 69 (arguing that writing is
itself the statute, and not merely a reflection or memorial of the statute).
215. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States .... ").
216. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 871 (1930). Note
that Radin, a realist, decried intentionalism in statutory interpretation at the same time
realism was advocating intentionalism in contract law. See id. at 872 (arguing that
legislative intent is "undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if it were discovered"); supra text
accompanying notes 112-25 (discussing realism's critique of classical contract
interpretation). Morris Cohen, another realist, did the same. See MORRIS R. COHEN,
LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 130 (1933) ("[L]egislative intent is an eliminable
fiction."); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 381, 399-400 (1941) (arguing that intention is more important in interpretation of
a contract than a statute). See generally Eskridge, supra note 138, at 642-44 (discussing
realist critiques of intentionalism in statutory interpretation).
In some sense, then, the realists anticipated a central argument of this Article:
intentionalism is appropriate for contracts but not for statutes. Indeed, in this light, one
can see "the new textualism" as the true heir of realism in American statutory
interpretation. Cf id. at 623 n.11 (coining phrase "new textualism" but arguing that it is
"a return to the nineteenth-century treatise approach to statutory interpretation"). But I
leave that theme for another day. On Radin's place in legal realism, see DUXBURY, supra
note 113, at 113, TWINING, supra note 112, at 76, and Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1227 n.18, 1234
n.34 (1931). On Cohen's, see DUXBURY, supra note 113, at 38, and HORWITZ, supra note
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Constitution grants Congress power to "make... [flaws, '217 and to do
so according to a precise, familiar procedure involving passage by
each House and presentment to the President.218 Each step of that
procedure concentrates on the statutory text:219 it is the text that each
House must pass; the text that the President must approve or reject;
and the text that each House must pass again, by a two-thirds vote, in
the event of a presidential veto.' 2
This mechanism has important implications for statutory
interpretation. Because only the text of a statute receives the
approval of the relevant actors, only the text can qualify as "law":
legislative intent can have no independent authority. 1 To be sure,
legislators may vote on a bill without giving the text a very close read.
There is evidence, indeed, that legislators pay more attention to
committee reports, which are often more comprehensible.222 But that
is not really the point. A statute is authoritative, not because the
legislators understood it, but because the legislators enacted it. As
Justice Scalia remarked in a recent essay, a statute "has a claim to our
attention simply because ... it has been passed by the prescribed
majority (with or without adequate understanding)." 22
112, at 183. For more on Radin's contribution to statutory interpretation, see infra text
accompanying notes 238-39.
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (conferring power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States").
218. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (describing procedure for enactment of "a Law").
219. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 169, at 27 ("[T]he constitutional
legislative process necessarily focuses on the text of legislation.").
220. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 169,
at 27-28 (describing legislative process in more detail).
221. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) ("It would demean the
constitutionally prescribed method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus
... is just a way to create some evidence about the law, while the real source of legal rules
[remains] the mental processes of legislators." (emphasis omitted)); LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 169, at 26 ("The Constitution and the structure of the legislative
process it establishes assume an approach to statutory interpretation that focuses on the
actual rather than the intended meaning of the statutory text."); Gonzdlez, supra note 6,
at 602-03 (describing "formalist" critique of intentionalism); cf. Slawson, supra note 6, at
421 (describing theory of "law as statute," in which "[tihe object of interpretation. . . shall
be the meaning of the statutory language").
222. See John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 690 n.70 (1997) (collecting authorities); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Legislative History Values, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 365,377 & n.44 (1990) (citing empirical
studies); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 445 & n.79 (1988) (same); cf. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 100
(observing that committee reports "often represent the most intelligent exposition
available of what the statute is all about").
223. Scalia, supra note 138, at 35 (emphasis omitted). A committee report, by
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Moreover, a regard for constitutional procedures is not merely
ceremonial. As others have pointed out, the bicameralism and
presentment requirements serve important functions as checks on
state power. 4 By insisting that proposed legislation pass through a
series of barriers-by making the legislative process more difficult
generally-these requirements encourage deliberation and make ill-
conceived laws less likely.3 In addition, by acting to disperse
legislative power among diverse actors with conflicting interests, they
help prevent any one "faction" from capturing government and
threatening "the liberty and security of the governed." 6
Here again the contrast with contract law is instructive. Contract
law, too, encourages people to deliberate before entering into
agreements.227  The doctrine of consideration, to give just one
example, exists in part to foster caution on the part of those about to
contrast, has authority only on the assumption that the majority of members read and
agreed with it-a questionable assumption. See Manning, supra note 222, at 690 n.70;
Scalia, supra note 138, at 34-35; see also infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text
(questioning representativeness of committee reports and other items of legislative
record).
224. The Framers, of course, understood this. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at
378-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing bicameralism); THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing presidential veto); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 552-53 (1969) (discussing presidential veto); id. at 559-60
(discussing bicameralism). For more recent expositions, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 169, at 28-30, 32-33, Manning, supra note 222, at 708-09, and Michael B.
Rappaport, Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 771, 782-83
(1997) (discussing presentment). See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983)
(discussing purposes served by bicameralism and presentment requirements). For an
argument that textualism reads too much into the bicameralism and presentment
requirements, see Eskridge, supra note 138, at 671-73.
225. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 169, at 28, 32; Manning, supra note 222,
at 708-09; see also Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than
One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 146, 151-59 (1992) (explaining bicameralism's role
as a "stopping mechanism"). As the Chadha Court explained: "The President's
participation in the legislative process was ... to protect the whole people from
improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two bodies assures that the
legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in
separate settings." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
226. Manning, supra note 222, at 708; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239,
1249 (1989) (arguing that bicameralism and presentment were Framers' "two antidotes to
factionalism"). The fear that "factions"-what we would today call "interest groups"--
would subvert government to their own ends was a central element of Federalism. See
WOOD, supra note 224, at 502-05; cf. Garrett, supra note 193, at 683 n.201 (discussing
Madison's use of term "faction").
227. Recall the classical argument that an objective approach to interpretation would
serve to encourage deliberation. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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incur legal obligations.' But nothing in contract law even
approximates the formalities of bicameralism and presentment.29
This is understandable when one recalls that the parties to a contract
bind only themselves.10 If they are hasty, they themselves will bear
the consequences. When it comes to statutes, though, the "parties"
do not bear the risk of their own mistakes. The public does.P1
Arguments for caution are therefore much stronger. Where the
interests and liberties of the public are at stake, prudence dictates,
and the Constitution mandates, that the "parties" be kept on a tighter
rein.
The formal significance of the statutory text, then, makes
reliance on legislative intent problematic. In addition, there are
substantial practical difficulties associated with identifying that
228. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory EstoppelArticle, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 303, 305 (1992); James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of
Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 992 (1990); Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the
Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
713, 828 (1996); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 5 (1979) (noting that an informal donative promise is unlikely to be the product of
deliberation). The classic exposition of this argument is Fuller, supra note 96, at 800. For
contrary arguments, see Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 39,54 (1992), and Wessman, supra, at 828-29.
229. Indeed, with some notable exceptions involving displays of bad faith or inequality
of bargaining power, courts do not do much in the way of policing the negotiating process.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 104, §§ 4.1, 4.9 (discussing abuse of bargaining process); id.
§ 4.28, at 332-35 (discussing unconscionability); see also Kull, supra note 228, at 54
(arguing that contract law does not display much concern about deliberation); Wessman,
supra note 228, at 829 ("Except in the sort of exceptional circumstances that justify an
application of the defense of unconscionability, the law simply does not police for
imprudence where exchange promises are concerned.").
Contract law did, at one time, rely on the ceremony of the seal to encourage
deliberation on the part of the promisor. See Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker,
Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 450 (1987); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of
Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 660 (1982); Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and
Status of a Promise Under Seal As a Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 617, 627
(1993). The seal was the product of a ritual in which the promisor impressed a personal
object, often a signet ring, in hot wax. See Holmes, supra, at 622, 630-31. A promise
under seal was traditionally enforceable without consideration, see Barnett & Becker,
supra, at 450, but the seal has largely fallen out of fashion in American jurisdictions. See
Eisenberg, supra, at 660; Wessman, supra note 228, at 833. But see Holmes, supra, at 663
(arguing that the law of seals is "vital in at least half of our jurisdictions"). An even
earlier example of a ceremony meant to encourage deliberation is the Roman stipulatio, a
ritual in which the promisor bound himself by answering "'Spondeo,'" (" 'I do pledge
it' ") in response to the formal question, " 'Spondesne?'" (" 'Do you pledge your
word?' "). Holmes, supra, at 627 n.33; see Fuller, supra note 96, at 800. For more on the
stipulatio, see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 68-94 (1990).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
231. For more on third-party effects of statutes, see supra Part III.B.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
intent-difficulties that do not arise in the context of contract
interpretation. A traditional contract, recall, has only two parties and
a limited subject matter.13z Examining the negotiating history of such
a contract should not be terribly inconvenient. It should be relatively
easy, as a general matter, to research that history and obtain a clearer
picture of what the parties actually intended in making the
agreement.
Examining legislative history for indications of legislative intent
is a far more dubious undertakingP 3  The typical federal statute
addresses not one, but numerous topics; often, these topics bear a
complex relation to one another.z 4 There are not two "parties," but
hundreds, most of whom remain silent during the statute's
"negotiation." 5  Committee members, sponsors, and floor
managers-veto players, in McNollgast's terms-may comment on
proposed legislation, of course. But there is no guarantee that their
statements reflect the views of their colleagues. 6  As Slawson
observes, the fact that the legislative record fails to note
disagreement may reflect other legislators' indifference,
inattentiveness, or even absence. 7
232. See supra text accompanying note 123. For a discussion of scholarship that
questions the validity of the traditional contract model, see supra note 123 (describing the
concept of "relational" contract).
233. See James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo. L. REV. 283, 307-
08, 313 (1995) (arguing that the use of negotiating history in the interpretation of a
collective bargaining contract is simpler than the use of legislative history in the
interpretation of a statute).
234. See Movsesian, supra note 121, at 72; see also Brudney, supra note 212, at 21 &
n.78 (noting the "unprecedented length and complexity" of contemporary federal
legislation).
235. See Movsesian, supra note 121, at 71; see also Radin, supra note 216, at 870-71
(noting that most legislators fail to offer an explanation of their views on legislation); cf
Westbrook, supra note 233, at 308 (observing that the negotiation of a collective
bargaining contract "is simpler and involves fewer players than the legislative process").
But cf. McNollgast, supra note 6, at 19 (arguing that the greater number of parties does
not provide a basis for distinguishing between contract and statutory interpretation).
236. See Eskridge, supra note 222, at 383; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 138,
at 327 ("Committee members and bill sponsors are not necessarily representative of the
entire Congress, and so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their statements to the
whole body.").
237. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 403-04; cf. Chafee, supra note 216, at 399-400
(depreciating the importance of intent "in the interpretation of a statute, in writing which
hundreds of persons participated with widely varying degrees of attention"). Slawson
observes:
An absence of conflicting statements in the record is not convincing evidence
that no one disagreed with a particular statement. No body of 435 members,
representing a wide variety of political opinions and parochial interests, really
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All this should make one skeptical that legislative history can
yield an accurate picture of legislative intent. Indeed, as Max Radin
argued decades ago, the notion that a collective body has an "intent"
at all is itself rather questionable~ s Individual legislators may have
intentions, of course, but it seems extremely unlikely that the
hundreds of legislators who make up a legislative majority vote to
approve legislation with "exactly the same determinate situations in
mind." 9 Recent public choice scholarship tends to confirm doubts
about the coherence of legislative intent.240 Indeed, the starker
versions of public choice scholarship maintain that a statute may bear
no relation whatever to the preferences of the majority of
legislators.241
To be sure, public choice theory remains controversial; some
have refuted its more troubling assertions about legislative chaos. 242
Even if a thorough examination of legislative history could yield an
accurate picture of legislative intent, though, the effort required
would be enormous.24 3 Consider, for example, the judge who adopts
has a unanimous intent about anything more controversial than apple pie or
motherhood. Absence of disagreement on the record is more likely to represent
the other members' inattention, lack of interest, or absence from the forum in
which the statement was offered.... Even floor statements may have been made
when only a handful of other members were present ....
Slawson, supra note 6, at 403-04.
238. See Radin, supra note 216, at 870-71. For good summaries of Radin's argument,
see Eskridge, supra note 138, at 642, and Manning, supra note 222, at 684-85.
239. Radin, supra note 216, at 870.
240. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547
(1983) ("Although legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it
turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent
collective choice."); Shepsle, supra note 6, at 248-50. Much of this scholarship addresses
the implications of Arrow's Theorem, which maintains that it is impossible to ensure that
a majority vote will reflect the voters' preferences among alternative options. See
Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241; see also Manning, supra note 222, at 685 n.53 (describing
Arrow's Theorem). For a more detailed description of the theorem, see FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 38-39.
241. Judge Easterbrook explains why:
Legislatures customarily consider proposals one at a time and then vote them up
or down. This method disregards third or fourth options and the intensity with
which legislators prefer one option over another. Additional options can be
considered only in sequence, and this makes the order of decision vital. It is
fairly easy to show that someone with control of the agenda can manipulate the
choice so that the legislature adopts proposals that only a minority support.
Easterbrook, supra note 240, at 547; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 39-42
(discussing implications of cycling, agenda-setting, and strategic behavior).
242. See Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988) (criticizing
reductionism of public choice analysis); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 47-
55 (offering empirical critique of Arrow's Theorem).
243. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 138, at 150-51 (noting the difficulty of searching
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the approach that McNolgast proposes.2 In addition to acquiring a
working familiarity with positive political theory, the judge must, for
every statute, identify the relevant veto players and determine their
preferences, making appropriate discounts for merely opportunistic
or strategic statements.245 To do this properly, the judge (or, more
likely, his law clerk) must sift through rafts of legislative material:
hearings testimony, committee reports, floor statements, and even
presidential signing statements.246
And the judge will not be alone. If judges make a habit of
searching the legislative record, lawyers must do so as well. The
communications revolution has made legislative materials more
accessible than they were a few decades ago, when Justice Jackson
wrote his famous criticism of legislative history,2 47 but finding and
examining such materials still takes substantial effort, particularly for
lawyers in smaller firms or cities.2 8 Short cuts are inadvisable: in a
vast legislative record, there is no telling where one might find
support for an argument about legislative intent.24 9 And the whole
"a long, heterogeneous, and often conflicting legislative history as it relates to a particular
issue in a current controversy"); Scalia, supra note 138, at 36-37; Slawson, supra note 6, at
408-09.
244. See supra Part I.A.
245. See McNollgast, supra note 6, at 16-29; McNollgast, supra note 1, at 718-27.
McNollgast provides mathematical models to help the judge in these endeavors. See
McNollgast, supra note 6, at 23-24; McNollgast, supra note 1, at 721-24,723 fig.1.
246. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 408. For a discussion of the controversial nature of
presidential signing statements, see MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 784-85. On the
role of law clerks, see Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("The excerpts [of legislative history] I have examined and quoted were
unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task.").
247. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring). In part, Jackson wrote:
[T]here are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible the
meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for all of
our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what their rights
under those laws are.... Aside from a few offices in the larger cities, the
materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer who can afford
neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing, or the cost of repeatedly
examining the whole congressional history.... To accept legislative debates to
modify statutory provisions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the
country.
Id (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Book Review, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 503, 503-04 (1960) (citing Justice Jackson's opinion in Schwegmann).
248. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 408 ("For almost any lawyer who is not in a large
firm in a major metropolitan area or in a government agency, the cost of such extensive
research is prohibitive."). But see Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200 (1982)
("Technology has made an anachronism of Justice Jackson's lament.... ").
249. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 408 ("Ordinarily all of the material must be read no
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process will repeat itself every time someone litigates a new case
under a statute °0 Conscientious lawyers will want to take a fresh
look at the legislative record,251 and one can hardly expect judges to
retain the details and nuances of complicated legislative bargains.
All this effort in the unlikely hope of discovering an implicit "intent"
that the text of a statute fails to reflect: the game hardly seems worth
the candle.52
D. Coda: Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
Contracts and statutes differ, then, in fundamental ways; the
contract analogy in statutory interpretation cannot hold. The reader
may still be left, though, with a question about Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States,' 3 the illustration with which this Part
began.' 4 At issue, recall, was a federal statute that made it unlawful
to encourage or assist the immigration of an alien "'under contract
... to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States.' "55
The United States brought a prosecution under the act against a
church that had recruited an English minister to serve as its rector.
Although the text referred to "labor or service of any kind," the
legislative history indicated that the legislators had intended the
statute to apply only to manual labor. As a result, the Court
reasoned, the church's contract with the minister did not fall within
the reach of the statute. 6
For reasons we have seen, this approach seems clearly wrong.
Yet if contract analogies are false, and the Court's intentionalism
matter what the question is, because there is no way of knowing in advance where
something pertinent may be found."). Judge Harold Leventhal once quipped that "citing
legislative history is ... akin to 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.'"
Wald, supra note 248, at 214.
250. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 409.
251. Justice Scalia, who served as Assistant Attorney General in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel, once estimated that his staff spent 60% of its time
"finding, and poring over, the incunabula of legislative history." Scalia, supra note 138, at
36-37.
252. "It is not impossible," observed Radin, "that ... knowledge [of legislative intent]
could be obtained. But how probable it is, even venturesome mathematicians will
scarcely undertake to compute." Radin, supra note 216, at 871.
253. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
254. See supra Part III.A.
255. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26,1885, ch. 164,
§ 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332, repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(2), 66 Stat. 163,
279-80). For the full text of this provision, see supra note 139.
256. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 457-65. For a detailed description of
the Court's opinion in Church of the Holy Trinity, see supra text accompanying notes 143-
55.
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incorrect, how should one resolve the case? In some sense, that is a
question beyond the scope of this Article, which attempts to
demonstrate only that contract and statutory interpretation cannot be
assimilated. A full-dress theory of statutory interpretation must
await another day. At least two possible resolutions to the case
suggest themselves, though, and the reader may wish to consider
them briefly.
The first would be to apply the statute according to its terms and
assess a penalty against the church. That is the approach Justice
Scalia has advocated in a recent essay,2 7 and, for reasons already
discussed, it has much to recommend it. To be sure, a penalty for
recruiting a foreign pastor seems harsh. But there is no constitutional
bar against harsh statutes, and this statute expressly requires that a
penalty be assessed. 5 If the church objects, its best course would be
to pursue an amendment to the statute or some other form of
political redress.
The second approach is more complicated. A traditional canon
teaches that courts should avoid statutory interpretations that
produce "absurd" results-results that offend, in a substantial way,
notions of reasonableness and common sense5 9 The classic example
involves a Bolognian statute that prohibited residents from
" 'dr[awing] blood in the streets' ": under the traditional canon, a
court would decline to apply such a statute to a surgeon who had
drawn blood while providing emergency medical assistance.260
257. See Scalia, supra note 138, at 18-23.
258. There is a constitutional bar against laws that prohibit the free exercise of
religion. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. Whether the statute at issue in Church of the
Holy Trinity is such a law is an interesting question beyond the scope of this Article. Cf
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 65, 92
(arguing that Court's conclusion "makes eminent sense in light of the First
Amendment"). As Justice Scalia has observed, the canon that courts should construe
ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional questions does not apply where, as in Church
of the Holy Trinity, the words of the statute are clear. See Scalia, supra note 138, at 20
n.22; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 169, app. at 101 (discussing canon that
courts should avoid interpretations that render a statute unconstitutional, unless the
statutory text is clear).
259. See Dougherty, supra note 146, at 150-51; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 169,
app. at 97; see also Popkin, supra note 138, at 879 (explaining that absurdity, in this
context, refers to a "statute's substantive content" rather than "textual gibberish"). A
version of this canon exists in many countries. See Robert S. Summers & Michele
Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES 461, 485
(D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
260. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868); see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *60 (discussing Puffendorfs example of Bolognian law);
Dougherty, supra note 146, at 139 (describing Bolognian example as "archetype" of
absurd-results canon). Kirby itself provides another famous example: the Court ruled in
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Interpreting an immigration law to prohibit the recruiting of foreign
clergy, one might argue, is absurd. Indeed, as we have seen, the
Court's holding in Church of the Holy Trinity derived in part from its
belief that such an interpretation would be incompatible with
America's heritage as a "Christian nation. 2 61
This approach has its problems. For one thing, the theoretical
basis for the absurd-results canon is questionable. To the extent the
canon derives from presumptions about legislative intent-"the
legislators cannot have intended this result"-it raises the difficulties
discussed earlier;262 to the extent it derives from judgments about
public policy--"this result is untenable"-it threatens legislative
supremacy. 261 Moreover, penalizing a church for recruiting a foreign
pastor does not seem absurd in the same way that penalizing a
surgeon would be in the Bolognian example, though of course this
may simply reflect changing social norms. The Court's observations
about America's religious heritage, incongruous today, may have
been unremarkable in the legal culture of the nineteenth century.
But these are all matters for another day. For our purposes, it
suffices to say that the absurd-results canon suggests a possible
resolution to Church of the Holy Trinity that merits further attention.
CONCLUSION
Scholars may feel a temptation to construct what Holmes once
called "the theory of legal interpretation":2" a single, comprehensive
set of principles for interpreting all legal texts. With respect to
contracts and statutes, at least, it is a temptation worth resisting.
Contracts and statutes differ in fundamental ways, and their
that case that a statute prohibiting interference with the mails did "not apply to a case of
temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for
murder." Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 487.
261. See Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 471; supra text accompanying notes
146-47.
262. See supra Part III.C (discussing problematic concept of legislative intent).
263. See Eskridge, supra note 222, at 378; see also Public Citizen v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 474 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting the potential of the absurd-results canon "to allow judges to substitute their
personal predilections for the will of the Congress"). But cf Dougherty, supra note 146,
at 165 (arguing that the tension between the absurd-results canon and legislative
supremacy is "dynamic" and "essential to the legal system").
264. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 417. Holmes conceded that "[d]ifferent rules
conceivably might be laid down for the construction of different kinds of writing," but
argued that, in practice, courts did not make such distinctions. Id. at 419. Holmes
believed that statutes and contracts both required the same interpretive method:
objectivism. See id.; see also supra note 75 (discussing Slawson's contract analogy).
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interpretation cannot be assimilated. Importing the intentionalism of
contract law into statutory interpretation mistakes the essence of
both.
This has some interesting implications for legal interpretation
generally. A unified theory, it suggests, one that explains everything
from constitutions to wills, is a chimera we should cease chasing. We
should focus, rather, on the differences among legal texts, and ask,
for each, the following sorts of questions: Whom does the text
affect? What formalities constrain its drafting? How complicated is
its negotiation? If we pay mind to these things, correct interpretation
will follow.

